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1.1 Evaluation in the Post-Truth Era
Interviewer: "Do you weigh scientific advice in arriving at policy positions?"
Congressmen: "We don’t. That’s ridiculous. You have a general posture, you
use the scientist’s evidence as ammunition. The idea that a guy starts with a
clean slate and weighs the evidence is absurd."
(Kingdon, 1989, 223).
We live in times in which it has never been easier to access information and yet truth
seems to be facing its biggest challenge in politics since the evolution of the national
state. Recently, an intensive debate on misinformation in the political arena has arisen, in
which media and political leaders accuse each other of disseminating so-called fake news.
Misinformation has always been observable in politics, but the focus lied on the revealing
of fake information during political campaigns in order to determine the most trustful
political representatives. Lately, public attention has shifted to misinformation in the
policy arena. In doing so, multiple cases have occurred where official authorities have -
awarely or unawarely - disseminated false information in order to legitimate their policy
decisions. Most prominently, the United States introduced an executive order in January
2017, which denied entry to the country to anyone from seven countries, which are mainly
populated by Muslims. The authorities argued that the policy’s objective was to keep
out "radical Islamic terrorists", despite the fact that the country has not been the target
of a single terror attack carried out by a citizen of any of the seven listed nationalities
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in the last forty years.1 In the post-truth2 era, it seems that the use of information has
become less self-evident in policy-making decisions than sentiments and emotions. Hence,
the question of which role remains for information in politics in this new era arises.
The question of how information, respectively scientifically generated evidence, influ-
ences the political arena has kept policy analysts occupied ever since the concept of policy
analysis was established. Wildavsky (1979) has prominently addressed this topic in his
book Speaking Truth to Power, in which he suggests that policy analysis’ (the truth) main
target is to influence politics (the power). Although the author emphasized that policy
analysis should never be the only factor for policy-making, the postulation that evidence
has to be utilized has always been present in many studies, in particular in research on
evaluation. Wildavsky himself has described this particularly well:
"The earliest substantial manifestation of analysis was evaluation of social pro-
grams. The evaluation industry (and it is an industry) employs many more
people than have ever been graduated from schools of policy analysis. One
thing evaluators learned was that most analysis is rejected by the organiza-
tions that sponsor it. But if policy analysis was to have practical importance
- intended to be, as it was, an applied subfield - it had not merely to be
done but to be used. One way bridging the gap was to develop a specialty
called implementation: a parallel effort was devoted to the utilization of policy
analysis. Hence emphasis shifted to the political uses and abuses of analysis"
(Wildavsky, 1979, xxvi).
Policy evaluations are a major source for policy-makers in order to obtain information
on how and whether a policy works. It is not surprising that the parole speaking truth
to power was picked up by many notable scholars of research on evaluation (Bussmann,
1The Economist, January 28th, 2017. "Donald Trump gets tough on refugees". Retrieved from
economist.com.
2The Oxford English Dictionary has announced post-truth as its word of the year 2016. Post-truth is
defined as "relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping
public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief". Oxford Dictionaries, January, 30th 2017,
"The Word of the Year 2016 is...". Retrieved from oxforddictionaries.com.
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1996; Chelimsky, 2001; Leeuw and Furubo, 2008; Patton, 2008; Eliadis et al., 2011; Head,
2013). Several studies indeed show that evaluations are used by public administrations in
order to improve policies, sometimes more, sometimes less (Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980;
Balthasar, 2007; Frey and Widmer, 2011; Frey, 2012; Ledermann, 2012). However, the
same does not apply to the parliamentary arena. Former studies show that the use of
evaluations in parliaments is extremely moderate (Whiteman, 1985; Weiss, 1989; Boyer
and Langbein, 1991; Hird, 2009; Bogenschneider et al., 2013; Eberli, 2017). If members of
parliaments use evaluations, then they tend to use them symbolically, rather than concep-
tionally or instrumentally (see citation of Kingdon (1989) in the beginning). Moreover,
evaluations are hardly ever influential, but when they are„ then they have an impact on the
dynamics within the decision-making of the parliament and do not affect the actual policy
outcome (Malen et al., 1988). To sum up, previous research shows that the relationship
of evaluations and parliaments can hardly be described as speaking truth to power.
Yet somehow, evaluations have found their way into the parliament. In 1999, Switzer-
land introduced the article 170 in the federal constitution, which urges the Federal As-
sembly to evaluate the government’s measures regarding their effectiveness or efficiency
(Widmer, 2007, 76). Moreover, France has adopted a similar law, which urges the Na-
tional Assembly to evaluate policies (Barbier, 2010, 45). In addition, some parliaments
have devoted the production of evaluations to specific units. Again, in the early 1990s
the Federal Assembly established a unit - Parliamentary Control of the Administration
- that conducts evaluations on behalf of the parliament (Bussmann, 2007). According
to (Jacob et al., 2015, 20), other countries, such as Australia, Sweden and France, have
also developed similar units, which conduct several evaluations for their parliaments every
year. Although there is a growing institutionalization of evaluations in the parliaments,
previous literature has hardly ever analyzed to what extent evaluations are demanded by
parliaments: the existence of evaluations seems to be an axiom that is taken to be true in
order to serve as a starting point for further research. As a consequence, previous studies
fail to present a compelling conceptual framework to explain why parliaments demand
3
evaluations. What drives members of parliament to demand evaluations, despite the fact
that there does not seem to be any particular interest in using the findings to enlighten
themselves? This thesis takes up this question and deals with three different puzzles.
The first puzzle deals with the evaluation demand of the members of parliament. Al-
though some authors have raised the topic (Toulemonde, 1999; Widmer, 2008a; Zollinger,
2009; Pattyn, 2014a), the main reasons why evaluations are demanded still remains un-
clear, in contrast to the rich literature on the use of evaluations (Shulha and Cousins, 1997;
Weiss, 1998; Kirkhart, 2000; Alkin and Taut, 2002; Henry and Mark, 2003; Patton, 2008;
Johnson et al., 2009; Alkin, 2012). If literature deals with the demand for evaluations, the
authors have often focused on the public administration (Widmer et al., 2001; Balthasar,
2007; Askim, 2009). In addition, only few scholars empirically analyze the reasons why
an evaluation is commissioned. While Balthasar and Rieder (2009) analyze the diffusion
process of the evaluation activity between the Swiss cantons, Pattyn (2014a) investigates
the motivation for conducting evaluation reports for the Flemish public sector. Some stud-
ies focus on the evaluation activity of a certain policy field, e.g. foreign affairs (Widmer,
2008a) or health (Balthasar, 2010). However, the parliament is often excluded from these
analyses, albeit their members request numerous evaluations every year and they are re-
garded as important stakeholders of evaluations (Pollitt, 2006; Vedung, 2010). Thus, we
barely know anything about their real motivation behind demanding evaluation reports.
What are the main factors that influence the parliamentarians to seek evaluations?
The second puzzle deals with the evaluation strategies of the parliamentarians. Previ-
ous evaluation literature has not only failed to provide reasons for parliaments to demand
evaluations, but also to explain which purpose members of parliament pursue when they
demand an evaluation. Studies on evaluation use suggest that members of parliament pre-
fer evaluations, which confirm their own opinions. Hence, parliamentarians tend to seek
evaluations, which support their argumentation, rather than to provide an information ba-
sis in order to make a decision (Alkin, 1973; Whiteman, 1985; Weiss, 1998; Bogenschneider
et al., 2013; Eberli, 2016). Generally, several studies have analyzed the strategic use of
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knowledge (Majone, 1989; Radaelli, 1995; Boswell, 2009). These articles argue that deci-
sion makers tend to use scientific reports for legitimacy, rather than to improve a policy
measure. However, the studies are mainly based on the public administration, whereas the
goals for parliaments to demand such reports still remain unclear. As a consequence, little
is known about the strategic use of knowledge in the parliamentary arena, especially of
evaluations. What purposes do parliamentarians pursue when they demand an evaluation?
Finally, the last puzzle deals with the evaluation demand of members of parliament
across the policy fields. In literature, it is often argued that the evaluation demand
varies between the policy fields. Several studies indeed show an unequal distribution of
policy evaluations across policy fields (Balthasar, 2007; Widmer, 2008b; Widmer et al.,
2009; Zollinger, 2009; Pattyn, 2014b; Jacob et al., 2015; Frey et al., 2016). In doing so,
most studies suggest that the different attributes of policy fields influence the differences
between them. However, the studies focus on the administration as well as the institutional
differences within the public administration. In regard to the parliamentary arena, Speer
et al. (2015) argue that parliamentarians clearly have a varying preference as to in which
policy field they demand an evaluation. However, there is no empirical study, which
includes all policy fields in one comprehensive study. The literature mainly provides
theoretical arguments and selects only certain policy fields. These circumstances lead to
a substantial academic void that has not yet been investigated. Why do the members of
parliament demand evaluations more frequently in certain policy fields than in others?
These three puzzles show that the real scope of the parliamentary evaluation demand
has neither been captured nor explained by the existing literature. This thesis presents
an analytical framework for evaluation demand in the parliament by combining the rich
literature on legislative studies and research on evaluation. Previous studies have either
neglected parliamentary theories, as they did not focus on parliaments (evaluation lit-
erature) or they were simply not aware of policy evaluations (parliamentary literature).
Although those lines of research have often investigated similar issues, communication
between them has been scarce.
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This thesis bases its analysis on the example of the subnational and federal parliaments
of Switzerland. There are many reasons to investigate the role of evaluation in these par-
liaments. First, although Switzerland has often been called an evaluation latecomer by
some authors (Horber-Papazian, 1990; Spinatsch, 2002), most authors agree that Switzer-
land currently has one of the most developed institutions regarding evaluations amongst
contemporary democracies (Jacob and Varone, 2004; Widmer et al., 2009; Sager et al.,
2017). This is especially true for the importance of evaluation in the parliament (Jacob
et al., 2015). On the one hand, evaluations have been implemented at the federal level
with the introduction of Art 170 in the federal constitution, which was adopted by most
cantons (Horber-Papazian, 2007). On the other hand, the Federal Assembly has its own
unit with the Parliamentary Control of the Administration, which conducts evaluations
for them. Moreover, there are ambitions to introduce such units at the cantonal level as
well (Eberli and Bundi, 2017, 249).
1.2 Outline of the Argument
In order to explain the demand for evaluations, one has to study how political science
explains the evolution of institutions. In this thesis, I propose a theoretical framework
that is mostly based on rational choice institutionalism. According to Hall and Taylor
(1996, 946-950), rational choice institutionalism has evolved from the studies of American
congressional behavior in order to explain how institutions were generated. The authors
explain the evolution of institutions by referring to the benefits, which the members of
the parliament gain from the establishment of the institution. In doing so, institutions
are arrangements by choice, which result from the recurring interactions of the parlia-
mentarians. As a consequence, the evaluation becomes an institution if the members of
parliament frequently demand them; most scholars refer to the establishment of such an
institution as evaluation culture (Owen, 2003; Bustelo, 2006; Patton, 2008; Preskill and
Boyle, 2008). Therefore, the questions arise of what benefits the evaluation provides for
the members of parliament, so that they have an incentive to ask for them frequently.
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Subsequently, this thesis argues that members of parliament demand evaluations in
order to win power over the government. In contemporary democracies, the policy process
is determined by a delegation of tasks, which involves multiple agents and principals
(Strøm, 2000). In doing so, parliamentarians delegate the implementation of policies - for
which they were elected by their constituency - to the government with its agencies. This
process results in a series of common-agency problems for parliaments and governments, as
the members of parliament - as the principal - cannot be sure whether the government and
its agencies implemented the policies in the way they were intended (McCubbins, 2014).
Hence, parliamentarians have strong incentives to control the government. Depending on
the institutional settings, the members of parliament have different approaches as to how
they can oversee the implementation process of the agencies (Lupia, 2003; Pelizzo and
Stapenhurst, 2012).
Although most parliaments have a rich variety of instruments to control the gov-
ernment, their efficient use is often restricted due to limited resources (time, personal
assistants, party offices). According to McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), parliamentarians
thus prefer fire-alarm oversight over police-patrol oversight. While police-patrol oversight
is centralized, active and directly executed by the parliamentarians (e.g. reading docu-
ments, monitoring agency activities, holding hearings), fire-alarm oversight involves less
parliamentary resources than the former model. Instead of systematically checking for
violations of legislative goals, the members of parliament established a system of practices
that allows the civil society to examine the administration’s work. As a consequence,
the importance of oversight approaches, which allow members of parliament to conserve
their resources, has increased. For example, Martin and Rozenberg (2014) show that the
parliamentary requests were more frequently used in the last couple of years.
The thesis argues that parliamentarians demand evaluations in order to fulfill their
oversight function, as they provide them with unique conditions for parliamentary over-
sight: Evaluation demands by parliamentary requests delegate the commission to the
responsible agency, which assesses the effectiveness or efficiency of a policy, and then pro-
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vides a final report including an executive summary as well as recommendations for the
members of the parliament. In other words, members of parliament can delegate the over-
sight function to the agencies themselves, but nevertheless have some certainty that the
evaluations are conducted independently, since they are most often delegated to evalu-
ation specialists, who do not belong the public administration (Balthasar, 2007; Dolder
et al., 2017). This is especially important in Switzerland, as the power of the parliaments
is restricted by two factors. On the one hand, the members of parliament have limited
resources. They are characterized by a low degree of professionalization, since most of the
parliamentarians pursue an occupation next to their parliamentary mandate, including
those at the federal level (Bütikofer, 2014; Bundi et al., 2017). Moreover, the parliaments
also lack in institutional resources (e.g. personal assistants, small parliamentary services)
that hinder parliamentary oversight. On the other hand, the parliaments are confronted
with strong governments, which, with the exemption of the Federal Council, are directly
elected by the people and cannot be dissolved with a vote of non-confidence. Above all, the
direct democratic institutions restrict the power of the parliaments significantly (Vatter,
2008). Since all these factors restrain the power of parliaments in Switzerland, evaluations
offer members of parliaments a worthwhile instrument to be requested.
This argumentation can be subdivided into three steps. First, the motivation of par-
liamentarians to demand an evaluation depends on their individual characteristics and
the institutional context. Some members of parliament are more likely to demand evalua-
tions, as they have a more positive attitude towards evaluations and are more aware of the
oversight function of the parliament. These are often members in oversight committees,
who have served in the parliament longer and more frequently engage in the leadership
boards of the parliament. Furthermore, institutional settings shape the context in which
the parliamentarians execute their parliamentary mandate. In doing so, the parliamen-
tarians’ attitude towards evaluation can be affected by an evaluation policy (evaluation
clause) that urges the parliament to ensure that the government’s implemented measures
are evaluated (e.g. Article 170 of the federal constitution).
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The second step consists of the evaluation’s strategies that a member of parliament
pursues when demanding an evaluation. Independently of the parliamentarians’ predis-
position to demand evaluations, a specific strategy is always pursued with an evaluation.
In doing so, evaluations can serve different purposes by providing information about a
specific policy. On the one hand, depending on the parliamentarians’ openness towards
the evaluation results, they can demand an evaluation to oppose or support a policy if
they can already anticipate the evaluation’s findings. On the other hand, parliamentarians
can demand an evaluation as a source of information, in case they have not yet formed
an opinion about a policy. This differentiation is based on the different types of instru-
mental and conceptional evaluation use (Rich, 1977; Weiss, 1989; Alkin and King, 2016).
However, the motivation behind these strategies is mainly based on the goal of being re-
elected or else to achieve better policy outcomes. Depending on their allocation in the
parliament, members of parliament will pursue different strategies. While parliamentari-
ans from legislative committees focus on policy advocacy in order to oppose an existing
policy, parliamentarians from oversight committees demand evaluations in order to obtain
information.
Last, the parliamentarians’ evaluation demand is also shaped by the context of the
policy, the policy field. Policy fields cover a certain amount of policies, which try to
solve similar problems of the society. In doing so, they are shaped by different public
and private actors, resources and varied perceptions by the voters. As a consequence,
policy fields differ in their nature and possess different requirements for accountability.
While some policy fields are less established and are questioned less frequently by voters
and members of parliament, they are more often the targets of policy evaluations. These
differentiations arise from different attributes of policy fields. In doing so, mainly two
attributes affect the accountability of a policy field. On the one hand, the extent of
delegation implies how often public activities are delegated to civil organizations and thus
how accessible the policy fields are for parliamentary oversight. On the other hand, the
need for legitimation describes the level of acceptance of the activities of a policy field
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and influences the parliamentarians’ motivation to demand an evaluation. In addition,
the policy fields’ closeness to science might also be important, as it is crucial whether an
evaluation can be conducted at all (e.g. existence of policy experts, feasibility to measure
outcomes).
To sum up, the parliamentary demand for evaluation depends on the individual parlia-
mentarians’ characteristics and their institutional settings, the strategy they pursue, and
the context in form of the policy field. These factors affect how parliamentarians perceive
their oversight function, respectively how intensively they perform their oversight role.
1.3 Summary of Findings
The findings can be divided along the three articles.3 The first article considers the ques-
tion of why parliamentarians demand evaluations with parliamentary requests. The basis
of the study is an online survey amongst the cantonal and federal members of parliament.
The quantitative analysis shows that Swiss parliamentarians demand more evaluations if
they have the impression that the administration is not implementing the policies within
their meaning. Furthermore, parliamentarians who are members of an oversight commit-
tee or the parliamentary board are more likely to demand an evaluation. In addition, the
more positive the attitude towards evaluations, the higher the probability that a member of
parliament will demand an evaluation. Hence, the finding suggests that parliamentarians
demand evaluations in order to fulfill their oversight function towards the government.
The second article considers the question of which strategies parliamentarians pursue
when they use parliamentary requests demanding an evaluation. The article’s finding relies
on twelve case studies of parliamentary requests from the Swiss parliament. The qualita-
tive analysis shows that parliamentarians of legislative committees submit parliamentary
requests to oppose a policy, but they do not seek an evaluation to support a certain policy.
3The articles can be found after this synopsis. I have made two modifications from the published version
in order to make the thesis more coherent. On the one hand, I left out the abstract in the beginning of the
respective article. On the other hand, I have integrated the references of all articles in one chapter at the
end of the thesis. Moreover, Tables 3.3 and 3.4 of the second articles are located in the Appendix, while
they were mistakenly placed in the main text in the published version.
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In contrast, parliamentarians of oversight committees submit parliamentary requests to
obtain information on specific policies. Moreover, the party membership of the responsible
Federal Councillor does not influence the evaluation strategy. These findings suggest that
parliamentarians use evaluations as an instrument to achieve their individual aims rather
than using the actual findings of evaluations for the legislation.
The third article investigates how attributes of policy fields influence the members
of parliament in their evaluation demand in a policy field. The empirical analysis of
the article is based on the same parliamentary survey that the first articles uses, and is
supplemented by an expert survey amongst Swiss political scientists in order to obtain data
on the attributes of policy fields. The quantitative analysis shows that parliamentarians
are more likely to demand an evaluation in those policy fields where cooperative forms of
governance are more present, since those policies are more difficult to assess and have a
higher need of legitimation. The study suggests that parliamentarians seek more control
in a policy field, where public activities are more often delegated to non-public actors or
the need for legitimation is particularly high. Furthermore, both effects increase with the
policy field’s closeness to science, which alludes that the supply of an evaluation has to
ensured before they are commissioned.
1.4 Contribution
Numerous studies either put evaluations or parliaments in the center of their investigation,
but only few studies have combined both research objectives and searched for the role
of evaluations in parliaments. This thesis investigates the importance of evaluations by
investigating the reasons of why members of parliament request them. In doing so, the
thesis makes four theoretical contributions to research on evaluation and presents new
empirical and methodological approaches to study the legislative-executive relations in
contemporary democracies.
The first theoretical contribution is the conceptualization of the evaluation demand in
politics. In order to understand why the origin of evaluations has rarely been investigated
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so far, one has to take a look back to the history of research on evaluation. Research on
evaluation started to grow in the 1960s, when scholars started to think about how to im-
prove the US-federal curricula (Cronbach, 1963; Scriven, 1967; Stake, 1967). Subsequent
researchers conceptualized evaluation as applied research with the central purpose of use-
fulness (Weiss, 1977; Wholey, 1979). This tradition continued and peaked during the late
1990s and early 2000s when scholars asked about the utilization, usability, and influence of
evaluations in the decision-making process (Weiss, 1998; Kirkhart, 2000; Henry and Mark,
2003; Mark and Henry, 2004; Christie, 2007; Patton, 2008). At the same time, the con-
cept of evidence-based policy making was developed, which proclaimed that all decisions
should be based on what works (Davis et al., 2000; Pawson, 2006). To sum up, research
on evaluation always had a focus on the aspects of learning, especially since many of the
researchers work as independent evaluators for authorities, which usually commission the
evaluations and are interested in improving the policy. However, this bias in evaluation
use is the reason why we still know very little about why evaluations are conducted. This
is where this thesis steps in, as it provides a theoretical conceptualization of evaluation
demand and suggests empirical explanations of the causes of the evaluation demand in
the parliamentary arena.
The second theoretical contribution is the distinction of different types of actors who
have an interest in an evaluation and the identification of those who are not primarily
learners, but also controllers. The previous paragraph showed that research on evaluation
has mainly focused on its use. However, most studies found that the use of evaluation is
often rather limited, as Weiss (1999, 477) describes particularly clearly:
"Evaluators find it hard to understand why policy makers do not listen to
evaluation results seriously and do their best to implement them in future
decisions about policy and program."
This is partly the result of the researchers’ omission to ask about the different needs of
the actors. While program planners of agencies, for instance, are interested in improving a
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policy and thus are often included in the evaluation process, parliamentarians as legislators
have a stronger interest in knowing how the policy was implemented by the administration
and whether it shows the intended effects. According to Borrás and Højlund (2015, 114),
evaluation’s learners are mainly program units and external evaluators, but not organi-
zational and external stakeholders. In this thesis, I argue that members of parliament -
often considered as stakeholders of evaluations - are more interested in summative than
in formative aspects of evaluations. While the latter concentrates on the improvement of
the evaluation object, the former indicates whether the objective has reached its intended
goals (Scriven, 1967, 62). Hence, this thesis shows that research on evaluation might bene-
fit from the differentiation of the actor’s perspective in the study of the role of evaluations
in the decision-making process.
The third theoretical contribution of the thesis is to explain parliamentary oversight
on the basis of the individual behavior of the parliamentarians, instead of relying on the
parliamentary oversight institutions. During the 20th century, there was a long period of
time in which literature focused on the role of the parliament as an institution and it has
been argued that the parliaments’ influence as such has declined (Martin et al., 2014). On
the one hand, it is argued that the growth of the welfare state after the Second World
War has led to an expansion of government activities, which exacerbate the information
asymmetry between the parliament and the agencies as well as causing the isolation of the
government from the parliament (Immergut, 1992). On the other hand, some authors have
argued that the increase of international cooperation (e.g. within the European Union)
has led to an erosion of parliamentary oversight over the government (Andersen and Burns,
1996; Raunio, 1999). More recently, studies have revised this picture by illustrating how
parliaments have reacted to win the challenge of both early involvement and information
rights (Raunio, 2005; Strøm et al., 2006; Saalfeld, 2005; Karlas, 2011; Winzen, 2012).
However, there has been a lack of information regarding the motivation for individual
parliamentarians to fulfill their oversight function. By using the example of evaluations as
a mechanism of parliamentary oversight, this thesis shows that oversight institutions are
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not a necessary factor for members of parliament to execute control, since they can use
other tools. Thus, the thesis illustrates that individual characteristics of parliamentarians
have an important influence on whether members of parliament will pursue parliamentary
oversight.
The fourth and final contribution of the thesis is to bring back the idea that policy
fields can shape the behavior of parliamentarians as a contextual factor. Already forty
years ago, Lowi (1972) argued that policies can also determine politics. In brief, the au-
thor distinguishes between different types of policies that shape the political arena by
influencing the relationships between the political actors. In doing so, Lowi’s idea was
enthusiastically applied in public policy research, but he was also harshly criticized by
several scholars (Kjellberg, 1977; Spitzer, 1987). It was argued that the political conse-
quences cannot be directly deducted from the policy typology, since the context of the
policy-setting also has to be taken into account. However, Lowi’s study called attention
to the differences between policies and the policy fields. Yet only little attention has been
paid to the comparison across policy fields, although the importance of policy fields has
widely been discussed in public policy literature (Sabatier, 1998; Baumgartner and Jones,
2010). Moreover, only few lessons were drawn in order to understand the behavior of
parliaments. This thesis demonstrates that the attributes of policy fields influence the
parliamentary arena by giving incentives to oversee some areas more than others. Thus,
legislative behavior is not only based on individual and contextual characteristics, but it
can be influenced by the nature of a policy field.
Furthermore, the thesis makes several empirical and methodological contributions,
which facilitate the analysis of legislative-executive relations. Empirically, the thesis
presents new data on different research areas. First, the parliamentary survey ParlEval
provides information on how members of parliament use evaluations in the fulfillment
of their parliamentary mandate (Eberli et al., 2014).4 Second, an elite survey amongst
Swiss political scientists generated data on policy fields’ attributes, which, up to now, has
4For detailed methodological information about the ParlEval survey see (Bundi et al., 2014).
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never been collected before. Both surveys were able to generate substantial response rates
(55.5% respectively 69.9%), which are a decent rate for elite surveys (Bailer, 2014). The
surveys follow a long tradition of parliamentary surveys in Switzerland (Kerr, 1981; Riklin
and Möckli, 1991; Krüger et al., 2001; Feh Widmer, 2015; Bütikofer, 2014; Strebel, 2014).
Last, the thesis presents empirical evidence from structure-guided interviews with parlia-
mentarians, which provide new insight in the motivation and purposes of parliamentary
requests at the federal level. Methodologically, the thesis uses both quantitative large-N
statistical analysis, as well as qualitative small-N case studies. Both strategies of analysis
have advantages, but they also lack in power of analysis in certain aspects, which is why
the combination of both can improve the strength of the empirical analyses (Bennett and
Elman, 2006). While quantitative studies give evidence about the behavior of a high num-
ber of parliamentarians, they tend to be vague on the specific motivations for members of
parliament. In contrast, qualitative studies provide insight into the reasoning of individual
parliamentarians, but they cannot guarantee whether those reasons also apply for other
members of parliament. The thesis uses both approaches and can provide evidence not
only on many variables that might foster evaluation demand, but also on the mechanism
of the parliamentarian’s motivation to ask for evaluations.
1.5 Implications
This thesis analyzes the evaluation demand by the Swiss parliaments. Despite the partic-
ularities of the political system, the Swiss case provides important implications for other
cases. In general, one can distinguish between implications for the evaluation demand
outside the parliamentary arena and for the evaluation demand of parliaments outside
Switzerland. Moreover, there are several implications for evaluation practice.
First of all, the findings of the thesis provide some insight to why evaluations are
demanded. Nowadays, most democracies make substantial efforts in order to assess the
effectiveness of their policies. Hence, a multitude of evaluations are commissioned every
year, in which the public administration is responsible for most of them (Balthasar, 2007;
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Jacob et al., 2015). In doing so, agencies might either conduct an evaluation on behalf
of the parliament or the government, or due to an evaluation clause in the law that calls
for them (Wirths, 2016). However, agencies often also decide to conduct an evaluation
independently of the public administration. Zollinger (2009, 85-86; 111-116) shows that
authorities indeed consciously generate evaluations. In doing so, the author shows that
the attributes of the policy field, an intense conflict over the choice of policy, as well as
high costs for the policy’s implementation were decisive factors for agencies to assess the
effectiveness of a policy. Moreover, the purpose of the evaluation is often to improve a
policy, but sometimes evaluations are also commissioned in order to legitimize a measure
at a later decision making stage (e.g. the parliamentary arena). These findings show
that evaluations are not commissioned for the evaluation’s sake, but that there are mostly
strategic motives behind the evaluation demand. While parliamentarians tend to demand
evaluations for oversight reasons, agencies conduct evaluations in order to improve the
policy, but also to legitimate it. This thesis shows that members of parliament seek
evaluations in order to control the agencies and indicates that agencies seek evaluations
to react to the parliamentarians’ need for accountability. By commissioning evaluation
reports, agencies can legitimate their resources and show that the policies, which were
implemented, are effective.
Second, the analysis provides implications about the parliament’s evaluation demand
in other countries. The studies of Speer et al. (2015) and Zwaan et al. (2016) illustrate
that other parliaments also demand evaluations with parliamentary requests. On the one
hand, Speer et al. (2015) argue that members of parliament frequently ask for evaluations
for the German Bundestag and the Flemish Parliament in order to hold the government ac-
countable. Most noticeably, the distribution of the evaluation demand varies significantly
across policy fields. On the other hand, Zwaan et al. (2016) illustrates that members of the
European Parliament often demand evaluations with parliamentary questions, especially
in order to demonstrate the Commission’s shortcomings. As this thesis has argued that
members of parliament demand evaluations in order to fulfill their oversight function, the
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findings imply that other parliamentarians will also pursue this strategy. However, the
oversight institution and capacities of parliaments differ substantially across the parlia-
ments, which is why they might use other instruments than a parliamentary request. If
parliamentarians have strong oversight institutions, they might choose to scrutinize the
agencies’ work within those institutions, e.g. by commissioning an evaluation. In contrast,
if parliamentarians have weak oversight institutions - as does the example of Switzerland
in this thesis - parliamentarians might use the possibility of parliamentary requests to
demand evaluations. In any case, evaluations provide an instrument for the members of
parliament to control the government. However, this thesis implies that parliamentarians
have to be aware of the instrument of an evaluation and that their members must be
sensitized for the oversight function, so that they will demand evaluations.
Finally, the thesis provides several implications for evaluation practice. First and fore-
most, the results show that parliamentarians are indeed interested in evaluations, even
though this may not be in the same way that most evaluators think of. If the evaluators,
but also agencies, which are often the commissioners of an evaluation, are interested in
increasing the relevance of evaluations for members of parliament, they must design the
evaluations differently. At the moment, evaluations are often commissioned with a focus
on learning (Sanderson, 2002; Balthasar, 2007; Dolder et al., 2017). Parliamentarians do
not prefer summative evaluations per se, but they expect at least some information on
accountability in the evaluation. Second, parliamentarians are often not aware of the
existence of an evaluation. The thesis shows that whilst members of parliament ask for
evaluations, they tend to be less interested in the results and the report. This partly
has its roots in the defective communication of evaluation results. According to Eberli
and Bundi (2017), most members of parliament read evaluation reports. However, most
evaluations are discussed within the agencies and only occasionally with other members of
the parliament. A way to make parliamentarians more aware of evaluations would be to
invite them to the external group that accompanies the evaluation process in a more con-
sistent manner. Third, the thesis shows that parliamentarians do not demand evaluations
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in order to use their results, but rather to oversee the agencies’ implementation process.
Weiss (1999) argues that decision-makers do not only base their decisions on information,
but also on ideology, interest, and institutions. Evaluation practice often automatically
assumes that evaluations need to be utilized in order to be relevant. However, the findings
of this thesis imply that evaluations can also have a high importance in the parliamentary
arena without directly being used.
1.6 Conclusion
Against all the previous research on evaluation that has been done in the last fifty years,
this thesis argues, that the main question is not whether and how members of parliament
use evaluations, but why they demand evaluations. The role of evaluation in the post-
truth era is not to speak truth to power ; instead it is seeking power with truth, as the
parliamentarians demand evaluations in order to gain power towards the government.
Seeking power refers to the ongoing institutional fight of parliaments against their in-
significance. Members of parliament have to face two main challenges nowadays. First,
politics happen more and more internationally due to increasing globalization. Thus,
intergovernmental institutions, such as the European Union, the United Nations or the
International Monetary Fund have gained influence. This does not necessarily mean that
decisions are made by or within those institutions, but that the interaction between gov-
ernments has increased, which is why governments have a more dominant role in policy-
making than they used to. Second, the amount of available information has exponentially
risen with the development of modern technologies. The Internet provides us with all
sorts of information - statistics, reports, data, analyses - at all times. While the govern-
ment has specialists in the form of public servants, who focus on certain areas and brief
the members of the government with the most relevant information they need to know,
members of parliament do not possess the same amount of resources. As a consequence,
the governments’ temporary dominant role has led to parliaments, whose members fear
the loss of their power.
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In contrast, truth refers to the means of the parliament to turn back the power shift
towards them. Parliamentarians have mainly increased their oversight capacities due to
the recent developments in their power loss (Winzen, 2012; Cheneval et al., 2015). There is
nothing like truth in politics, but there is more than just purely ideology. Evaluations are
a form of truth that constitute a scientific service, which systematically and transparently
assess an objective (Widmer and DeRocchi, 2012, 11), which is why there consequently
should be no discussion on the results of an evaluation. However, political actors often
do not agree about the interpretation of the findings, which might lead to the misuse
of evaluations. Cousins (2004, 392) distinguishes between different forms of evaluation
misuse: Evaluations can either not be applied by being misused (mistaken and mischievous
use) as well as unjustly not used (abuse), and justly not used (rational and political non-
use). In addition, Frey (2012, 64) differs between analytical and political rationality when
using evaluations. While the former has the aim to improve the outcome of the policy by
incorporating the results of an evaluation, the latter seeks to delay a policy or to convince
other actors. Since there is no agreement about the interpretation of an evaluation, the
findings might be called alternative facts5, depending on the view of the individual member
of parliament. Thus, parliamentarians use evaluations in the way that an evaluation could
suit them for the achievement of their political goals: Seeking power with truth.
The thesis provides new theoretical and empirical insights in an area that, up to now,
has hardly been investigated. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that the thesis
cannot provide an answer to all questions, which may be asked. First, the design of the
analysis is cross-sectional, which does not allow any statement regarding developments
over time. There are many advantages, which cross-sectional studies may provide. In this
thesis, a cross-sectional design was more promising regarding the data quality, as retro-
spective data often entails validity problems (Bernard et al., 1984). This is even more
5The phrase alternative facts was first used by Kellyanne Conway during an interview, in which she
defended White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer’s false statement about the attendance at Donald
Trump’s inauguration as President of the United States. Blake, J. January 22, 2017. "Kellyanne Con-
way says Donald Trump’s team has ’alternative facts.’ Which pretty much says it all", retrieved from
washingtonpost.com.
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relevant in the young field of evaluation that is still developing in politics. Second, the
analysis entails limited information about the influence of third parties on the evaluation
demand. In Switzerland, third parties traditionally have a strong influence on the Swiss
political system due to its militia character. The thesis suggests that third parties (e.g.
interest groups) might influence members of parliament to demand evaluations. Interest
groups are often the main addressees of policies and provide parliamentarians with ex-
pertise in order to make decisions. Hence, interest groups might either foster empirical
evidence or try to prevent the spread of a new analysis. Third, the thesis deals little with
the perspective of the government. It is assumed that the government and its agencies are
the strong counterparts of the parliament, but simply implement the evaluation demand
of the parliamentarians. If the members of parliament really demand evaluations in order
to (re-)gain power over the government, then the government should be aware of this situ-
ation and filibuster such evaluation requests. The government might either argue against
an evaluation in the response to the parliamentary request, or it can realize the evaluation
in its favor, since its authorities are often responsible in implementing the evaluation.
After more than fifty years of research, the relationship between knowledge and politics
is still not defined after all. This thesis is able to provide strong empirical evidence in order
to identify the role of evaluation in parliaments. However, many questions are still open,
which need to be answered by future research in order to understand how information
sources, such as evaluations, are used in the parliamentary arena. I hope that this thesis
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2.1 Introduction
In the last twenty years, the importance of evaluations has increased worldwide, which can
be observed due to their rising institutionalization (Fouquet and Méasson, 2009; Barbier
and Hawkins, 2012; Jacob et al., 2015). In times of recession and austerity, evaluations are
an important information source for policy makers in order to estimate the effectiveness
and efficiency of public expenses (Leeuw, 2009; Frey and Widmer, 2011).1 Considered as an
academic service, evaluations assess government actions systematically and transparently
and contribute to the successful operation of the state in various ways (Widmer and
DeRocchi, 2012, 14,27). Unsurprisingly, Dahler-Larsen (2012) argues that we live in the
age of evaluation.
Even though governments spend a considerable amount of financial resources for evalu-
ations every year, the question about the origin of evaluations has rarely been investigated
so far, since research on evaluation has mainly focused on the use of evaluation (Whiteman,
1985; Cousins and Leithwood, 1986; Weiss, 1987,9,9; Kirkhart, 2000; Alkin and Taut, 2002;
Henry and Mark, 2003; Balthasar, 2007; Askim, 2008; Johnson et al., 2009; Askim, 2009;
Frey and Widmer, 2011). Within the political system, the parliament is an important
demander of evaluations, as evaluations are particularly useful for members of parliament.
On the one hand, evaluations provide information for the legislation in order to make a de-
cision (Weiss, 1989; Christie, 2003, 9). The evaluation reports contain information either
about what consequences policies have or what policies work.2 On the other hand, eval-
uations help parliaments to fulfill their oversight function towards the government (Lees,
1977; Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2012; Bättig and Schwab, 2015). Consequently, recent
1In literature, it is widely discussed, which role evaluations played during the financial crisis. While
some authors see an increasing amount of evaluations due to the austerity, others argue that evaluations
do not seem to have helped policy makers to solve the dilemma of spending (Marra, 2013; Curristine and
Flynn, 2013, 126).
2Retrospective evaluations are well discussed in the context of evidence-based-policy-making (EBPM).
According to EPBM, evidence should take the center stage in the decision-making process in order to
make more effective policies (Davis et al., 2000). In contrast, prospective evaluations as Regulatory Impact
Assessments appraise policies ex ante in order to inform decision-makers. As such evaluations predict and
evaluate the consequences of an intended public policy under specific conditions, they can help parliamen-
tarians to make better regulations (Rissi and Sager, 2013, 348).
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studies have observed an increasing importance of evaluations in the parliaments (Speer
et al., 2015; Jacob et al., 2015).
Although some authors have discussed the demand for evaluation (Toulemonde, 1999;
Widmer, 2008a; Zollinger, 2009; Pattyn, 2014a), literature has so far mainly neglected
the origins of evaluation. Moreover, scholars have completely left the parliament as a de-
mander of evaluations out of the discussion, although parliamentarians are an important
stakeholder of evaluations (Vedung, 2010, 268). The knowledge about the parliamentar-
ians’ motivation to demand evaluations may lead to evaluations where parliamentarians
have stronger interests to be involved. Moreover, parliaments often ignore evaluation re-
sults (Weiss, 1999, 474). In order to increase the evaluation utility for parliamentarians,
one has to understand what parliamentarians are seeking in evaluations, so that evalu-
ators can improve the evaluation practice (Rog, 2015, 226). Hence, this article aims to
contribute to research on evaluation by explaining the demand for evaluations specifically
within the parliamentary arena.
In this article, I consider the question of why members of parliament demand eval-
uations with parliamentary requests. Building on the delegation literature (Kiewiet and
McCubbins, 1991; Strøm et al., 2006; Braun and Gilardi, 2006), I argue that the chain of
delegation has two consequences for the parliament in order to fulfill its oversight function.
On the one hand, a parliamentarian cannot be sure whether an agency will implement a
policy in the parliament’s sense (bureaucratic drift). On the other hand, the parliament
often lacks in information in order to access the implementation by an agency (asym-
metric information). Hence, I argue that parliamentarians demand evaluations in order
to hold the government and its agencies accountable. In doing so, the article examines
the hypotheses that a parliamentarian’s perception of the extent of bureaucratic drift and
asymmetric information influence a parliamentarians likelihood to demand an evaluation
with parliamentary requests.
I analyze these arguments empirically with a parliamentary survey that was conducted
amongst Swiss parliamentarians at the national and subnational level in order to obtain
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information about their relationship to evaluations. Switzerland is of particular interest,
as it is characterized by an advanced evaluation culture (Jacob, 2002; Jacob and Varone,
2004; Balthasar, 2007; Mader, 2009; Horber-Papazian and Jacot-Descombes, 2012; Horber-
Papazian, 2015). According to Jacob et al. (2015, 145), the Swiss parliament is charac-
terized by a high institutionalization of evaluation compared to other parliaments from
OECD member states. Moreover, a general evaluation clause was introduced in the course
of the new federal constitution in 1999, urging the Federal Assembly to ensure that federal
measures are evaluated with regard to their effectiveness (Widmer, 2007, 76).
This article is structured as follows: First, section 2.2 illustrates how parliaments can
demand evaluations in Switzerland. Section 2.3 describes the concept chain of delegation
and how delegation affects the evaluation demand by the parliament. Then section 2.4
presents another group of variables, which might influence the demand for evaluations.
Section 2.5 introduces data and methods, together with the operationalization. Then
section 2.6 presents the results of a multi-level analysis, which shows that parliamentarians
are more likely to demand evaluations with parliamentary requests if they think that the
administration does not implement the policies in their sense. Finally, section 2.7 discusses
the results, while section 2.8 concludes them and discusses their relevance for research on
evaluation.
2.2 How Parliaments Demand Evaluations In Switzerland
Switzerland has not only developed a high degree of evaluation institutionalization, but
also an active evaluation practice, even if the administration activity is not evaluated in
a comprehensive and frequent way (Mader, 2009, 60). According to Jacob et al. (2015),
Switzerland has the second highest evaluation culture after Finland. In doing so, the
country has the most developed institutionalization of evaluation within the parliaments
of all OECD member states.
Swiss parliamentarians have different possibilities in order to demand evaluations.3 In
3In this article, an evaluation is defined as a report or document that systematically and transparently
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general, one can distinguish between two different ways: On the one hand, parliamen-
tary committees can demand evaluations directly by commissioning specialized units with
an evaluation. Although this procedure has a legal basis, committees hesitate to go by
this way in Switzerland, with the exception of the Parliamentary Control of the Admin-
istration.4 On the other hand, individual members of parliament can indirectly demand
evaluations. In doing so, parliamentarians do not commission evaluations directly, but
urge the government to evaluate a policy. Parliamentarians can either include an eval-
uation clause5 into the law that obliges the agencies to conduct an evaluation and to
report about its results (Bussmann, 2005) or to submit a parliamentary request to the
government. According to Janett (2004, 145), Swiss parliamentarians prefer to demand
evaluations with parliamentary requests.
In dong so, parliamentarians ask for all sorts of evaluations. Bundi et al. (2016) ana-
lyzed the parliamentary requests of parliamentarians at the federal level between 2010 and
2014. In total, the members of parliament submitted 188 parliamentary requests that de-
manded an evaluation, which all had different characteristics (Table 2.1). In doing so, the
study distinguished between the evaluation purpose, perspective, and object6. According
to the analysis, the parliamentarians most often demand evaluations in order to prospec-
tively assess the effectiveness of a strategy. These findings confirm the results of Balthasar
(2009, 497), who argues that parliamentarians are rather interested in prospective than
retrospective evaluations.
In the next section, I will present the theoretical framework of with whom I plan on
answering my research questions. The relationship between the parliament and the gov-
assesses the effectiveness, efficiency, benefit and/or costs of a policy.
4The Parliamentary Control of the Administration is the competence center of the Federal Assembly in
matters of evaluations and conducts evaluations on behalf of the control committee. The unit only exists
on the federal level, yet its function is partly fulfilled by the cantonal audit offices (Grüter, 2013, 650).
Since 1993, they have conducted 62 evaluations: http://www.parlament.ch/pvk (Last Update: 2.9.2015).
5Bussmann (2005, 97-99) distinguishes between four different types of evaluation clauses: General,
institutionally focused and area-field focused evaluation clauses, as well as evaluation clauses for para-
state institutions.
6Policy evaluations can target different levels of policies. Widmer and DeRocchi (2012, 26) differ
between five levels. Single measure, project (several measures, temporary), program (several measures,
perpetual), strategy (several projects or programs), and policy field.
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Table 2.1: Parliamentary Evaluations in Switzerland 2010-2014





























ernment is characterized by a principal-agent relationship, since the parliament delegates
the implementation of policies to the government (Lupia, 2003).7 Hereafter I will argue,
that the delegation of policy implementation leads to a principal-agent situation, in which
evaluations help parliamentarians to oversee the executive’s actions.
2.3 Delegation & Evaluation
A central concept in the policy cycle process is the chain of delegation, in which those au-
thorized to make political decisions mandate others to make such decisions on their behalf
(Strøm, 2000; Strøm et al., 2006; Braun and Gilardi, 2006). In contemporary democra-
cies, the chain of delegation starts with an election where citizens delegate their policy
preferences to politicians (Müller et al., 2006, 19-21). The elected politicians - the parlia-
mentarians - are responsible for transforming the policy preferences into the legislation.
Since they only have limited resources and lack in specific policy knowledge, parliamen-
tarians are not suitable for the implementation of the legislation. Hence, they delegate
7The principal-agent theory is rarely ever used in research on evaluation. Although Vedung (2008)
used the framework prominently in order to distinguish between political actors in an evaluation context,
there are only few other examples (Van Thiel and Leeuw, 2002; Clements et al., 2008).
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the implementation of the policies to the government, which usually distributes the tasks
amongst the heads of the different government departments. The chain of delegation closes
when the responsible heads of the government departments delegate the implementation
of the specific policies to their public servants.
The concept of the chain of delegation was developed in the context of parliamentary
democracies. Although Strøm (2000, 264) argues that Switzerland is not a parliamentary
system, as the government is not dependent on the parliament’s confidence8, the concept
is also suitable for the Swiss context. Concerning the policy process, two additional steps
in the chain of delegation appear. First, Swiss voters can not only delegate their policy
preferences to their representatives through the process of elections, but also influence
the policy process directly via direct democratic instruments (Linder et al., 2010; Vatter,
2016). They can change the constitutions if a majority of voters and cantons accept the
proposal in a ballot. In doing so, they delegate their policy preference to the government,
which leads us to the second additional step of the Swiss chain of delegation. In general,
the government prepares the policy proposals and delegates them to the parliament - about
75% of the bills are developed by the executive (Vatter, 2016; Lüthi, 2014). Although the
government prepares the policies, the parliament has a strong influence on the legislative
proposals. Studies on the rate of the amendments assume that more than forty percent of
the government proposals are modified within the parliament (Jegher and Lanfranchini,
1996; Schwarz et al., 2011). After the parliament has formulated the policy, the remaining
process is equivalent to other parliamentary democracies. As soon as the parliament
has formulated a policy and submitted it to the government, the policy is assigned to a
particular department, which delegates the implementation to an agency (Figure 4.3).
In literature, it is often argued that the chain of delegation can be modeled as a
principal-agent relationship (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991; Huber, 2000; Müller et al.,
2006). The principal-agent theory describes the basic problems between a principal and
8The Federal Council - the Swiss government - is elected in the beginning of the legislature by the
parliament for four years. However, the parliament is not able to dissolve the government. Unless the
members of the Federal Council resign, they stay in their position for the complete legislature (Klöti et al.,
2014, 195).
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Figure 2.1: The Chain of Delegation in Switzerland
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an agent (Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1983; Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1991).
According to Gilardi and Braun (2002, 147-148), the principal commissions the agent to
render a service in his advantage in exchange for a certain reward. The theory is based
on the assumptions of a methodological individualism: From this point of view, the agent
is interested in reducing its effort as much as possible - as long as the principal barely
can be satisfied. The principals’ interests are insufficiently taken into account, as the
agent does not inform the principal about opportunities for action. Hence, the principal
cannot control whether the agent accomplishes a task that should be done whilst he is
dependent on him. As a consequence of this dependency, the principal has to deal with
an uncertainty, if the agent proceeds in a certain way in order to achieve his goals.
According to Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991), two problems appear in the delegation
process between the parliament and the agencies, which implement the delegated tasks
by the government. First, the parliament may not approve of an implementation of a
certain policy by the agency. This situation is often called bureaucratic drift in literature,
since the public servants drift away in their interpretation of the policy from the goals of
the parliament (McCubbins et al., 1989, 435-440). Second, the parliament may lack in
information in order to assess the policy implementation by the agency. Since the public
servants know much more about the implementation of a policy than the parliament, there
is an asymmetric information between them (Banks and Weingast, 1992; Saalfeld, 2000).
As a consequence, there is uncertainty as to what extent the agency will implement a
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policy in a way, which the parliament would approve. In order to reduce this uncertainty,
the chain of delegation is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs
in the opposite direction (Müller et al., 2006, 19). According to Lupia (2003, 44-51),
the problem of bureaucratic drift and asymmetric information gives the parliament an
incentive to seek information about the government. He argues that such information can
be generated in institutions and can distinguish between ex ante and ex post mechanisms.
On the one hand, ex ante mechanisms help parliaments to learn about their agencies
before and to anticipate asymmetric information problems. On the other hand, ex post
mechanisms can be used in order to learn about the agencies’ actions after the task and
to deal with bureaucratic drift. Members of parliament have different possibilities in
overseeing the administration units in order to control them and ensure accountability.
According to McCubbins and Schwartz (1984), parliaments have a strong preference to
fire alarm oversight where the parliament only intervenes in the case of indications from
the media or the civil society. In doing so, they can organize hearings, inspections or
commission evaluations in order to fulfill their oversight function.
In Switzerland, the parliament’s oversight function is not only weakened by the di-
rect democratic instruments, but also by the strong position of the government. Thus,
the control capacity of the Swiss parliaments are rather limited compared to other coun-
tries (Schnapp and Harfst, 2005). In order to fulfill their oversight function, the control
committees are the most important institutions for Swiss parliaments. The committees
continuously control the administration with inspections by establishing subgroups, which
focus on a special issue and write a report with recommendations for the attention of the
government. Though, the government is not always responsive to the recommendations.
Although it comments on the reports and often agrees with the findings, they put forward
good reasons why no changes are needed in the present practices. Furthermore, the control
committees also have problems in dealing with the high amount of information, which is
why other instruments are taken into account (Mastronardi, 1990, 139-144).
As a consequence, the Swiss parliaments cannot control the complete policy imple-
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mentation process. While hearings and inspections are difficult and costly to establish
with non-public actors, and the resources of the control committees are limited, members
of parliaments focus on parliamentary instruments (Wiberg, 1995; Proksch and Slapin,
2011). Evaluations in particular seem to be an instrument to oversee the activities of
agencies and thus to provide accountability (Pollitt, 2006; Jacob et al., 2015, 40). During
evaluations, agencies have to report about their activities and provide information for par-
liaments. Not only do the parliamentarians gather information about a certain policy, but
also do they find out how the administration has implemented it. Moreover, evaluations
allow parliamentarians to selectively oversee the policy implementation, which they tend
to prefer than monitoring all activities. Hence, parliamentarians mainly demand evalua-
tions in order to hold the government accountable (Widmer and DeRocchi, 2012; Speer
et al., 2015). Thus, following hypotheses are investigated:
Hypothesis 1: The bigger a parliamentarian’s perceived bureaucratic drift, the
more likely a parliamentarian will demand an evaluation with parliamentary
requests.
Hypothesis 2: The stronger a parliamentarian’s perceived asymmetric infor-
mation between the parliament and the agencies, the more likely a parliamen-
tarian will demand an evaluation with parliamentary requests.
Since research on evaluation has not investigated the motivation for the parliamentary
demand for evaluations, only little is known about this topic. Hence, it seems appropriate
to focus on further explanatory factors. Building on literature about evaluations and par-
liaments, several aspects have to be considered in order to answer the research question. I
call this variable group the (un)usual suspects, since some of them are known to be impor-
tant for the evaluation activity in literature, while others are less well discussed. In the
next chapter, I will explain their relevance for the parliamentary demand for evaluations.
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2.4 The (Un)Usual Suspects
In research on evaluation, the attitude towards evaluations has widely been used as an
explaining factor in several studies. According to Johnson et al. (2009, 384), several studies
analyze the influence of attitude on the utilization of evaluations, but unfortunately find
no clear evidence in the investigated articles.9 On the other hand, literature on evaluation
capacity building (ECB) uses the attitude towards evaluations as a requirement in order
to build evaluation capacity (Labin et al., 2012). In both research areas, a more positive
attitude towards evaluations leads to a higher use of evaluations or ECB. There is a good
reasons to believe that the individual attitude of parliamentarians towards evaluation
not only varies amongst them, but also has an influence on the motivation to demand an
evaluation (Mark and Henry, 2004; Christie, 2007). Parliamentarians with a more positive
attitude towards evaluations are more likely to demand evaluations, because they are more
familiar with them and they see a profit.
Hypothesis 3: The more positive a parliamentarian’s attitude towards eval-
uations, the more likely a parliamentarian will demand an evaluation with
parliamentary requests.
The most important characteristic of parliamentarians is their ideology. The political
parties have a different attitude towards the state or the society which effects their behavior
in the parliament. According to Balthasar and Rieder (2009, 416), a parliament will rather
check the administration’s performance in cantons with a high percentage of liberals and
conservatives, but the authors have not found a significant influence. However, Frey (2012,
279) argues that politicians from the political center allow themselves to be convinced by
evaluations, as the political ideology moderates the openness towards evaluations. Since
they are more open for evaluative information, it does not seem unlikely that political
center parliamentarians demand evaluations with parliamentary requests more often than
9The latest investigation suggests rather no effect on the evaluation utilization. According to (Bogen-
schneider et al., 2013, 266), parliamentarians from New York and Wisconsin do not often use evaluations,
although they have quite a positive attitude towards them.
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a parliamentarians of a left- or a right-wing party.10
Hypothesis 4: A parliamentarian of a center-party will more likely demand
an evaluation with parliamentary requests than a parliamentarian of a left- or
right-wing party.
Parliaments are usually subdivided into committees, which can be distinguished between
two different types. According to Heierli (2000, 18), both the federal and cantonal level
know committees which differ in their time-frame (standing and ad-hoc) and their function
(legislative and oversight). The oversight committees both deal with questions about the
government and administration’s actions. While the finance committees oversee the bud-
get, the control committees supervise the government, the administration and the courts.
In doing so, both come across evaluations more frequently than other parliamentarians.
Since the oversight committee members are more exposed to evaluations, it is more likely
that they will more often demand evaluations than other members of parliament.
Hypothesis 5: A parliamentarian of an oversight committee will more likely
demand an evaluation with parliamentary requests than a parliamentarian which
is not a member of an oversight committee.
As mentioned in the introduction, Switzerland has a general evaluation clause, which
shall encourage the parliament to let the public policies be evaluated on their effective-
ness. While the federal level has known this type of evaluation clause since 1999, some
cantons included a general clause in their constitution afterwards, or had it even before
(Horber-Papazian, 2007, 137). A general evaluation clause is an article in the constitution
that suggests that public measures should be evaluated. Although a general evaluation
clause is mostly of symbolic use and does not have a binding effect, there is a probabil-
ity that this factor influences the parliamentarians motivation to demand an evaluation
with parliamentary requests. A general evaluation clause provides a legal foundation in
10In addition, Speer et al. (2015, 45) argue that DIE LINKE in Germany has the highest interest in
EBPM, but it remains unclear whether this result is due to ideological preferences or to their opposition
role.
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order to conduct an evaluation and foster the parliamentarians’ motivation to demand an
evaluation.
Hypothesis 6: A parliamentarian in a parliament, whose constitution has a
general evaluation clause, will more likely demand an evaluation with parlia-
mentary requests than a parliamentarian in a parliament, whose constitution
has no general evaluation clause.
The institutional position of a parliament towards the executive can also influence the
parliamentary demand for evaluations. A study from Kaiss (2010) illustrates the cantonal
variation of the parliament’s power in an index.11 While Geneva and Berne have strongly
developed legislative competences, Glarus and both Appenzell Outer Rhodes and Inner
Rhodes have rather weaker positions. I argue that the stronger the parliamentary rights
are, the more the parliament will demand evaluations, because it feels at eye level with
the government.
Hypothesis 7: The stronger the institutional position of the parliament to-
wards the executive, the more likely a parliamentarian will demand an evalua-
tion with parliamentary requests.
In the next section I will discuss the data and the methods that I use to examine the
hypotheses. In doing so, I discuss the parliamentary survey and the operationalization of
the variables that are included in the model.
2.5 Data & Methods
The basis of this study is an online survey amongst the cantonal and federal members
of parliament, which was conducted during May and June, 2014. The parliamentarians
11The index measures the parliament’s power towards the government and is based on the three main
functions of the parliament: election, legislation and oversight. In total, 17 indicators are used for the
measurement (e.g. possibility to elect the head of the government, right to initiative legislation, power of
the committees etc.). For more information see Kaiss (2010).
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were asked about their relationship to evaluations.12 In total, 1570 parliamentarians have
participated in the survey, which comes up to a response rate of 55.3%.13 Compared to
similar surveys amongst Swiss parliaments, this percentage is relatively high. Brun and
Siegel (2006) achieved a response rate of 21.3% in a survey about performance reports
in the context of new public management. Focusing only on the federal level, Bütikofer
(2014) was even able to collect 65% in the lower and 70% in the upper house.
In order to measure the dependent variable - the demand of an evaluation with par-
liamentary requests - the parliamentarians were asked if they ever submitted a request
in the last four years in order to investigate a public policy regarding its effectiveness or
efficiency. The independent variables were also mostly collected through the online-survey.
The delegation variables were obtained by asking the parliamentarians if they agreed that
the administration implements the legislation in their meaning, or that they had enough
information in order to judge the administration’s implementation. In contrast, the par-
liamentarian’s attitude towards evaluations is measured on a multi-dimensional scale. Ac-
cording to Rosenberg and Hovland (1965), attitude is based on a three-dimensional struc-
ture, which contains cognitive, affective and behavioral components. First, the cognitive
dimension illustrates the (potential) knowledge about evaluations. Second, the affective
component indicates the parliamentarian’s benefit of an evaluation. Finally, the last di-
mension indicates the behavioral intention of a parliamentarian whether the person will
use an evaluation. Hence, the parliamentarians were asked whether they read evaluation
summaries, if they think that evaluations are useful for them, and if they usually use
evaluations in order to make decisions. The three items are gathered together in a single
index.14 In addition, I create a dummy variable for parliamentarians of center parties15
12As parliamentarians have a broad understanding of an evaluation, the survey gave a definition in the
introduction: "In this survey, evaluations are interpreted as studies, reports or other documents, which
assess a state’s measure in a systematic and transparent way with respect to their effectiveness, efficiency
or fitness for purpose."
13N=2841. Note that some seats were vacant due to parliamentarians’ withdrawals.
14Cronbach’s α of the three items is 0.69, they correlate significantly on the 99% level.
15Following parties are considered as a center party: FDP.The Liberals, Christian Democratic People’s
Party, Green Liberal Party, Conservative Democratic Party, Evangelical People’s Party, and Christian
Social Party.
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and a dummy variable for the membership in an oversight committee. Similarly, a dummy
variable indicates if there is a general evaluation clause in the cantonal or federal consti-
tution, while the institutional position is measured by an index according to Kaiss (2010).
Moreover, I also include several control variables: Age, sex, urbanity, education, profes-
sionalization, parliament experience, board membership16, the size of the administration
and the expenses on the cantonal and federal level. The operationalization is summarized
in Table 4.5 in the appendix.
Two aspects have to be considered when choosing a suitable method to examine the
hypotheses. First, the outcome of the dependent variable is binary, which is why I will use
a logistic regression model. Second, the data is grouped into a higher level (parliaments).
Thus, the parliamentarian’s behavior might be dependent on the parliament in which
the parliamentarians is part of. Hence, a multi-level approach is pursued, as it involves
data which is arrayed hierarchically and has several advantages (Steenbergen and Jones,
2002). In doing so, I can integrate variables on the parliament level in my model, which
I expect to have a theoretical impact on the parliamentarian’s probability to demand a
parliamentary request. However, in this way I also can reduce the standard errors, which
would be underestimated if the parliament variables had not been integrated in the model.
In doing so, I cluster the data with regard to the parliaments.
Through the statistical analysis, I will test the two theories against each other in
order to find out if the delegation variables can explain the parliamentary demand for
evaluations or if the (un)ususal suspects play the leading part in this story. Hence, I
will test different models which distinguish between their included variables. However,
in literature on evaluation, hardly anything is known about the parliamentary demand
for evaluations. As a consequence, I will first illustrate the distribution of the dependent
variable.
16The parliament board is responsible for the organization and for the procedures of the parliament and
thus has a leading function.
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no yes, one time yes, several don't know
"Did you propose a parliamentary request in order to examine a state measure regarding
its implementation and effects?"
2.6 Results
In the survey, the parliamentarians were asked if they proposed a parliamentary request
in order to examine a state measure in the last four years (Figure 2.2). Almost 50% of the
parliamentarians which participated in the survey replied with no. On the other hand,
nearly the same percentage (49%) demanded an evaluation with a parliamentary request
during the last four years. Within this group, there is about the same share of parliamen-
tarians that proposed only once (24%), respectively several times (25%). At a first glance,
this percentage seems quite high. However, one has to consider that parliamentary re-
quests can not only be proposed by a single parliamentarian, but also by several members
of parliament, especially when a committee is the initiator of the request. Moreover, by far
not all parliamentary requests successfully pass the parliamentary arena. Note: N=1499
If the parliamentarians responded with no, they had to declare their most important
reason for not demanding an evaluation with a parliamentary request (Figure 2.3). Ac-
cording to more than 42%, no suitable opportunity ever arose. 26 percent of the asked
38
parliamentarians indicated that the administration already provides enough evaluation
reports. Moreover, 7% of the members of parliament argued that they have only been in
the parliament for a short time and have not much experience. Only few parliamentari-
ans chose the response option that there is no need for such studies and that evaluations
should be resigned for financial reasons (each 7%). Hence, only 13% mention rather
negative reasons why they do not demand evaluations, albeit one can assume that par-
liamentarians with no suitable opportunity may simply not be interested in evaluations.
This corresponds to the responses to the question about the parliamentarian’s utilization
of evaluation.17
As a next step, I will check the determinants for the probability to demand an evalua-
tion with a parliamentary request. In doing so, I executed six different models (Table 2.2).
First, an "empty model" is tested in order to ascertain if there is any variance on the parlia-
ment level. In doing so, Model 0 has no indicators on the individual- and parliament-levels,
suggesting some autocorrelation in the variance of parliamentary requests on the parlia-
ment level. The likelihood ratio test shows that the error terms correlate on the parliament
level, since the variance between them do not equal to zero.18 Hence, it seems reasonable
to use a multi-level approach, which should explain the variation at the parliament level.
Model 1 tests the explanatory strength of the delegation variables, controlling the
parliamentarians’ predispositions and political dispositions. As we can see, the variable
bureaucratic drift has a significant effect, which means that if a parliamentarian thinks
the administration implements the legislation in the meaning of the parliament, the par-
liament’s probability to propose a parliamentary request decreases. On the other hand, it
seems that it has no effect if a member of parliament thinks he has enough information
to judge the implementation. However, also the professionalization, the experience in a
parliament and the membership in the parliament board have a highly significant influence
in whether an evaluation will be demanded. When the variables on the parliament level
17The parliamentarians were asked if they use evaluations for legislation (11% never), oversight (13%),
and budget-making-decisions (12%).
18ψ is significant at the 10% level.
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"Why did you not propose a parliamentary request in order to examine a state measure
regarding its implementation and effects?" (N=724)
are also included, the outcome does not change remarkably (Model 2). Not only does the
effect of the political dispositions stay highly significant, but also the effect of the variable
bureaucratic drift. On the contrary, the size of the administration and the public expenses
do not seem to have an effect.
After testing the effect of the delegation variables, Model 3 checks if the variables
of the group (un)usual suspects I have an influence on the dependent variable. The
parliamentarians’ attitude towards an evaluation and the membership in an oversight
committee are indeed significantly positive, while the party ideology does not seem to
be of relevance.19 In contrast, the professionalization of a parliamentarian is no longer
significant. This finding indicates that the effect of professionalization in Model 2 and 3 is
probably not robust. A possible explanation could be an interfering effect of the (un)usual
suspects I variables. In Model 4, the variables on the higher level are added, as well as
the parliamentary disposition and the (un)usual suspects II. Compared to Model 3, the
coefficients stays stable. While the evaluation base in the cantonal and federal constitut-
19Concerning the party ideology, I also tested the effects for every single party as well as for the two
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ion only has a weakly significant effect on the parliamentarians likelihood to demand an
evaluation, the institutional position has no influence at all.
In Model 5, I combine the delegation variables and the (un)usual suspects. The full
model confirms the prior results and provides evidence for hypotheses 1,3, and 5, and tends
to reject hypotheses 2,4,6, and 7. First, the perceived bureaucratic drift seems to influence
a parliamentarian’s likelihood to demand an evaluation, while the asymmetric information
has no influence. Second, the parliamentarians’ predispositions do not seem to be impor-
tant, but their political dispositions indeed play a crucial role. Third, the un(us)al aspects
have no influence on the parliamentarian’s motivation to demand an evaluation, apart
from the attitude towards evaluations and the membership in an oversight committee.
The effects of the variables can also be observed in the predicted probability to demand
an evaluation (Figure 2.4).
The figure illustrates the individual propensity to demand an evaluation for the effect
of the variables bureaucratic drift, attitude, board member and evaluation base.20 As
the graphs show, the strongest effect can be observed between a parliamentarian with a
negative attitude and a parliamentarian with a high one. The other variables have a less
strong effect, but also the 95% confidence interval is broader.
2.7 Discussion
In the end, who demands evaluations in the parliament? The statistical analysis provides
some evidence that those parliamentarians demand evaluations who want to hold the
government accountable. Since they have the impression that the agencies might not
implement the policies in their sense, parliamentarians seem to take evaluations as an
instrument in order to fulfill their oversight function. Hence, it is not surprising that
parliamentarians in an oversight committee tend to demand more evaluations than their
colleagues who are not. In addition, a parliamentarian needs to have a positive attitude
towards the instrument evaluation in order to request it. The analysis also shows that
20All other individual and contextual determinants are at the median.
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more experienced members and members in a leading position (parliament board members)
demand more evaluations, which suggests that they are more sensible to accountability
than their colleagues. As a consequence, the evidence from the analysis suggests that the
parliamentarians see themselves as principals who want to control the agent, in form of
the bureaucratic agencies. Moreover, these findings confirm other studies that suggest
that parliamentary requests are an important instrument in order to perform oversight
(Proksch and Slapin, 2011; Martin and Vanberg, 2008). As Wiberg (1995) argues that
parliaments rather control the government by threatening it with a vote of confidence
than by parliamentary requests, the latter receives an even more important role since the
Swiss parliament cannot dissolve the government. However, since the exertion of such
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instruments are time-consuming, members of parliament demand evaluations sparingly.
These conclusions could be very relevant for literature on evaluation use and evalu-
ation practice. In the last fifteen years, several scholars have argued that research on
evaluation should shift from evaluation use to evaluation influence in order to capture ad-
vanced impacts and consequences of evaluations (Kirkhart, 2000; Mark and Henry, 2004).
However, Herbert (2014, 412) argues that present studies on evaluation influence have
several limitations. On the one hand, the studies rely mostly on the information from
the evaluator, whose perspective could be biased. On the other hand, several studies fo-
cus on self-reports by organizational stakeholders that have an interest to be perceived
as an evidence-based organization. Hence, the findings of this study provides important
new insights from the parliamentary arena, an important stakeholder of policy evaluations
(Vedung, 2010). The findings mostly coincide with those of Speer et al. (2015), who have
investigated the evaluation demand in the Flemish and in the German parliament. Com-
pared to these parliaments, the Swiss case can be classified between them. While Swiss
members of parliaments rather ask for evaluations for reasons of accountability than to use
the evaluation information as in Germany, parliamentarians from opposition and govern-
ment parties do not differ from each other in their evaluation demand as in Flanders. This
is not surprising since Switzerland is considered as a consensus democracy, which involves
a substantial share of parties in the government (Lijphart, 2012; Sciarini et al., 2015). The
results imply an important message: If an evaluation wants to be relevant and influential
for a parliament, it should rather focus on accountability than on learning. Evaluators
can enhance the utility of evaluations when they pay attention to the parliamentarians’s
needs. This conclusion corresponds with the findings of Borrás and Højlund (2015, 114)




In the last twenty years, evaluations have established themselves as an important instru-
ment to asses public policies. In research on evaluation, the motivation for the production
of evaluations has rarely been investigated empirically so far. Moreover, the role of the
parliament has completely been neglected in this discussion, although an evaluation is
an important tool for the members of parliament. In this article, I have developed the
argument that parliamentarians demand evaluations in order to hold the government ac-
countable. The statistical analysis of the parliamentary requests demanding an evaluation
indicates that Swiss parliamentarians ask more likely for evaluations if they think that the
administration does not implement the policies in their sense.
This study has also some limitations. When conducting a survey, different sources of
measurement errors can additionally occur that may question the analytical power of the
sample, even if the number of participants is sufficient. Generally, there are two main prob-
lems: On the one hand, the representativeness of the sample can be biased by the members
of parliament who did not participate, since the non-responses might differ significantly
from the responses of the participants (self-selection). On the other hand, the responses
are reported directly by the parliaments themselves. Since the members of parliament
have to remember their past actions on evaluations, they are likely to under- or overesti-
mate their activities (misreporting). In addition, the findings are also limited due to the
fact that only one country was investigated, although Switzerland is very appropriate for
these research questions, since it is characterized by a high evaluation institutionalization.
However, more studies from other countries would help to explain the demand for evalu-
ations. Moreover, it would also help to understand wether the strong evaluation culture
affects the evaluation demand by the parliament. The analysis suggests that the individual
factors are more important than the context, even if the evaluation culture might influence
all parliamentarians. This finding alludes that the analysis provides information on the
parliamentary evaluation demand that goes beyond the case of Switzerland.
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This article offers strong empirical evidence for the explanation of the motivation be-
hind the parliamentary demand for evaluations due to a new database which was gathered
by conducting a survey. Until now, only selective aspects have been researched in the
relationship between parliaments and evaluations. Although plausible arguments were
discussed in this article, it is clear that more research has to be done in order to under-
stand the role of evaluations in parliaments. In my opinion, this article is a useful starting




Table 2.3: Operationalization of the Variables




In the last four years, did you propose a parlia-
mentary request in order to examine a state
measure with regard to implementation and
impact?






Age of a MPs in years
Rescaled on a continuous scale 0-1
Parliament
Survey








What is your highest degree of education?
Dummy: 0 for under pedagogical university,





Over the last year, what is the amount of time
spent for your parliament mandate, in percentage






How many years of experience do you have in a









Membership in the parliament office





Generally, the administration implements
the legislation within the meaning of the
parliament






The parliament has enough information to
judge the administration’s implementation
of the legislation







Index of three dimensions:
- During the last four years, how many
times did you read an evaluation summary?
- Evaluations are a useful instrument for
me as a member of parliament.
- Whenever possible, my political decisions
are supported by evaluation or other studies.
Categorial scale: 1 = never/strongly disagree





Membership in a center party






Membership in an oversight committee























General evaluation clause in the cantonal/
federal constitution













ER = Expected relationship; HYP = Hypothesis corroborated (C) or proven false (F); supp = Data
supplemented
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Table 2.4: Descriptive Statistic of all Variables
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Parliamentary Request 1474 0.493 0.500 0 1
Age 1570 0.517 0.102 0.21 0.83
Sex 1570 0.301 0.459 0 1
Urbanity 1570 0.643 0.479 0 1
Education 1481 0.511 0.500 0 1
Professionalization 1483 0.239 0.161 0 1
Parliament Experience 1486 10.576 8.330 0 56
Board Member 1570 0.147 0.348 0 1
Bureaucratic Drift 1486 0.915 0.278 0 1
Asymmetric Information 1448 0.711 0.454 0 1
Attitude 1508 2.719 0.628 1 4
Center Party 1570 0.452 0.498 0 1
Oversight Committee 1492 0.396 0.489 0 1
Size of Administration 1570 17810.630 17108.07 344 57747
Public Expenses 1570 13291.960 3527.737 7530 23662
Evaluation Base 1570 0.571 0.495 0 1
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3.1 Introduction
Policy evaluations fulfill an important function within contemporary democracies. They
assess a public policy in regard to its effectiveness, efficiency or fitness for purpose. This
information is not only potentially interesting for the public administration, but also for
other institutions. Since members of parliament (MPs) have to make many decisions
about unfamiliar issues, evaluation studies may provide them with information on specific
policies (Weiss, 1999, 478). Moreover, recent studies show that MPs use evaluations for
accountability (Speer et al., 2015; Bundi, 2016) as well as agenda-setting (Zwaan et al.,
2016) by demanding evaluations with parliamentary requests.
In general, parliamentary requests allow MPs to initiate new policies or to receive in-
formation about them, which is why they belong to the most powerful tools of parliaments
(Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2012). On the one hand, some studies argue that parliamen-
tary requests allow parliaments to align the government’s actions with their own voters’
preferences, as they enable MPs to set the agenda (Raunio, 1996; Martin, 2011a; Bailer,
2011). On the other hand, authors state that parliamentary requests are a useful tool
to control the government, since they provide information on how the government imple-
ments policies (Russo and Wiberg, 2010; Proksch and Slapin, 2011). Policy evaluations
meet both needs for MPs, since they provide information for legislation and oversight.
However, previous literature fails to explain which purposes MPs have when they submit
a parliamentary request to demand an evaluation. Thus, this article aims to look behind
the scenes of parliamentary procedures in order to understand the strategies of policy
evaluations in parliaments.
This article considers the question of which strategies MPs pursue when they use par-
liamentary requests to demand an evaluation. The paper argues that MPs are mainly
driven by the aspiration of reelection and seeking desirable policies. In order to achieve
these goals, they can make use of legislative roles: Either they appeal to their constituency
or they promote their party so that the party leadership rewards them. Previous studies
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suggest that MPs are mainly influenced by two organizational allocations: Committee and
party group membership (Bowler and Farrell, 1995; McElroy and Benoit, 2007). Depend-
ing on their allocation, MPs pursue different strategies with policy evaluations.
Empirically, the analysis is based on a comparative case study approach (Yin, 2014).
In doing so, the study investigates twelve parliamentary requests, which were submitted
between 2010 and 2014 at the federal level in Switzerland. Evaluations are particularly
well established in the Swiss political system and are highly institutionalized in the par-
liament compared to other democracies (Jacob et al., 2015). Furthermore, Switzerland
is a least likely case for the observation of legislatives roles. On the one hand, the Swiss
parliament has weak oversight capacities and only knows a limited opposition system due
to the consensual character of the Swiss democracy (Vatter, 2016). On the other hand,
parliamentary groups still tend to have a powerless position within the parliament, which
can be observed by their low voting unity (Bailer and Bütikofer, 2015; Coman, 2015).
The study shows that MPs indeed pursue different strategies with evaluations. The
committee membership has a considerable effect on the strategy of an evaluation. While
MPs from oversight committees seek information with evaluations, MPs from legislative
committees demand evaluations in order to oppose a policy. On the contrary, the party
group membership does not influence the evaluation strategy. These findings provide
important implications for research on evaluations. Not only does the study contribute
to research on the demand of evaluation, which has rarely been investigated so far, but it
also illustrates that MPs pursue different strategies with evaluations. Evaluations might
be demanded for social betterment, but they are also requested for the pursuit of personal
goals (e.g. reelection, policy outcomes). This conclusion indicates that we have to change
our understanding of the role of evaluation in the decision-making process. MPs use
evaluations as an instrument rather than the findings of evaluations.
The article is structured as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the theoretical framework
and the hypotheses. Section 3.3 discusses the research design and case selection. Section
3.4 presents the findings of the case studies, which are discussed in section 3.5. Section
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3.6 concludes the results and discusses the implications of the findings for research on
evaluation.
3.2 Theory
Strategic behavior is an important component for MPs, as several studies have illus-
trated the importance of strategic voting in parliaments (Farquharson, 1969; Clinton and
Meirowitz, 2004; Rasch, 2014; Bütikofer and Hug, 2015; Hug et al., 2015). Moreover, MPs
also express their strategic nature by the use of parliamentary requests (Bowler, 2010;
Martin, 2011b; Kellermann, 2013; Martin and Rozenberg, 2014; Kellermann, 2016). In
doing so, MPs mainly have two motives for their activities. On the one hand, they may
submit parliamentary requests to attract attention from the public, since they are influ-
enced by their electoral vulnerability. This argumentation is based on the assumption
that MPs have incentives to maximize their votes in order to succeed in elections (Norris,
2004, 98-101). On the other hand, they might propose parliamentary requests in order
to influence the political agenda. As a consequence, they do not primarily aim to get
reelected, but rather focus on their desirable policy outcomes (Müller and Strøm, 1999).
Both interpretations of the motives are based on a rational choice perspective. How-
ever, rational choice institutionalism differs across the context. Shepsle (2006, 28-30)
highlights the importance of rational choice for structured institutions. A parliament is
usually a structured institution, in which MPs are elected by their voters and thus are an
agent of their constituency. By rule, MPs are authorized to act on behalf of their voters
during their election. Since the voters delegate their policy preferences to the MPs, the
latter are also accountable towards them (Müller et al., 2006).1 Therefore, MPs spend a
considerable amount of time and effort to appeal to their voters, by responding to their
mail or attending public events (Kellermann, 2016; Giger and Lanz, 2016). Also, they
focus on the topics in the parliamentary arena from which they believe that voters will
1However, André et al. (2014, 234) argues that voters need to have the possibility to monitor the MPs’
actions, and also to sanction or reward them for their performance.
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reward them in the next election. In doing so, MPs can use parliamentary requests in
order to propose a political project, which is favorable to their voters (André et al., 2014).
Moreover, it can lead to additional publicity for the author, since media frequently reports
about parliamentary requests (Van Santen et al., 2015).
Although electoral vulnerability is doubtless an important trigger, MPs might also
be motivated by policy outcomes. This idea is based on the idea that MPs are not only
accountable to their constituency, but also to their own party. Katz (2014) recently showed
that a MP has multiple principals. In order to get reelected, MPs do not only have to
care about their voters, but also about their party, since the party leadership is often
responsible for nominating the candidates. They also have the power to obstruct a MP
from the election, if the MP does not seem favorable for them. Albeit parties do also
care about electoral success, they care a little less about individual MP success, but more
about policy and political competition (Benoit and Laver, 2006). In order to enforce their
policies’ preferences, parties depend on their internal cohesion. According to Kam (2014,
399), party cohesion is the degree to which members of the same party work together in
order to pursue the party’s goal. Most prominently, MPs from the same party should
coordinate their votes to pass the policy (Krehbiel, 2000; Kam, 2009). As a consequence,
parliamentary questions should not request an issue, which contradicts the party’s opinion
or is detrimental to it. More important, parliamentary questions could lead government
members of the same party to inconveniences, if the request reveals a governmental failure
(Jensen et al., 2013).
Subsequently, MPs do not only have to consider their constituency, but also their party.
Since the voters and the party are the collective principal that chooses an MP to act as its
agent, they are vulnerable to the usual kinds of agency problems: Adverse selection and
moral hazard (Strøm, 2000, 270). In doing so, voters, and partly also the party both face
problems of hidden information and action, since they cannot be fully informed about the
politicians who plan to run for office. Hence, both relationships entail a form of delegation,
thus make the MPs accountable towards their voters. Since both have a strong influence
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on how MPs behave in the parliament, MPs sometimes face a dilemma between what is in
the interest of their own party and what is important for their voters (Carey and Shugart,
1995). The crucial point for MPs is to satisfy both interests at the same time.
Legislative roles2 help MPs to satisfy both voters and party leaders. Various studies
emphasize the different roles amongst MPs (Wahlke, 1962; Andeweg, 1997, 2014; Scully
and Farrell, 2003). Strøm (2012) argues that MPs pursue different goals depending on
their situation in the parliament. In doing so, their situation is often influenced by their
organizational allocation. In most parliaments, MPs are divided into legislative and over-
sight committees in addition to their membership in their party groups. According to
Saalfeld (2000), these memberships have a high influence on how MPs interpret their role
in the parliament. While members of oversight committees tend to focus on the control of
the administration, members of the legislative committees seek to promote themselves by
policy advocacy. Moreover, parties delegate their members into committees urging them
to represent their party’s preference in the legislative committees.
In Switzerland, MPs might use parliamentary requests in order to assume such leg-
islative roles. Parliamentary requests are generally considered as the instruments, with
which the Federal Assembly3 can influence the political agenda directly, since the agenda
of committees is mainly determined by the Federal Council and its departments (Vatter,
2016, 285). They enable MPs to propose a new policy or to obtain information on specific
matters. In general, one can distinguish between four different requests: Motion, pos-
tulate, interpellation, and question.4 The requests vary in their procedure and goal. A
motion instructs the Federal Council to initiate a new policy proposal or to undertake a
2In literature, the term legislative roles is often used to describe the behavioral patterns or routines
that MPs adopt. However, apart from legislative aspects, these patterns can also include oversight goals
(Strøm, 1997).
3The Swiss Federal Assembly is a bicameral parliament. In contrast to other countries, the lower
(National Council) and upper house (Council of States) are perfectly symmetric, since they have exactly
the same prerogatives (Bütikofer and Hug, 2010, 178)
4In addition, the National Council has a question time every second or third week of session. During
the question time, the Federal Council orally answers written questions, which their members have received
in the beginning of a session. Furthermore, MPs can submit parliamentary initiatives to propose a new bill.
However, these initiatives are directly treated by a legislative committee instead of the Federal Council
(Vatter and Wirz, 2015).
58
certain action. A postulate requests the Federal Council to examine and report on whether
to submit a new policy proposal or to undertake a certain action. In addition, MPs can
also request a report on a different matter with a postulate. Finally, an interpellation or a
question requests the Federal Council to provide information on matters that are related
to the Swiss Confederation.5 A parliamentary request can be submitted by individual
MPs, a parliamentary group or a committee. Although they are often signed by several
MPs, usually only one MP is the author of the parliamentary request.
Policy evaluations might be a particularly worthwhile request for a MP, as they provide
information for legislations (Weiss, 1989; Christie, 2003) and for overseeing the government
(Lees, 1977; Bundi, 2016). Therefore, MPs might use evaluations in order to assume spe-
cific legislative roles. In doing so, they have different possibilities to demand an evaluation.
With interpellations and questions, MPs ask the government whether they would support
an evaluation for a certain policy. In contrast, a motion includes an evaluation of a policy
within the new bill, which finally results in an evaluation clause if the legislation is passed
in the parliament (Bussmann, 2005). The most direct way to demand an evaluation is the
postulate. In doing so, the MP requests a report about a policy regarding its effectiveness
or efficiency. However, the process of all parliamentary evaluation requests that demand
an evaluation can be structured into four different stages: Background, Trigger, Strategy,
and Purpose. The background and trigger have an influence on the MP’s evaluation strat-
egy, which determines the purpose of the evaluation. Figure 3.1 identifies the process and
illustrates how the demand for a policy evaluation develops.
Background: MPs react to certain circumstances with parliamentary requests. Either
a policy has turned out to be a failure or a policy has changed and it is uncertain whether
the change causes new effects. In order to spot such policy failures, a MP may demand an
evaluation in order to obtain information about the deficient policy (Linder and Peters,
1990, 307). In contrast, a policy change harbors perils due to its unknown effects. Hence,
policy changes also often increase the need for information in order to calculate the impact
5Art. 118-125 ParlG, SR 171.10.
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Trigger : Two factors usually trigger MPs to submit parliamentary requests to a specific
issue. On the one hand, MPs have a special interest in a certain policy field due to their
personal background or their specialization within parliament (Searing, 1991; Bowler and
Farrell, 1995). Since MPs only have limited resources, they often specialize in certain
policy areas in which they are members of a committee. On the other hand, several
studies have shown that interest groups are often the main driver behind parliamentary
questions (Raunio, 1996; Bailer, 2011). According to Richardson (2000, 1009), interest
groups provide information, which influences the decision-making process. Therefore,
interest groups are keen on evaluations due to their information content.
Strategy: Previous studies show that evaluations can be used instrumentally, conceptu-
ally or symbolically (Rich, 1977; Knorr, 1977). While instrumental use refers to situations
where MPs make a decision based on evidence, conceptual use indicates that MPs gradu-
ally improve their understanding of an object. In addition, symbolic use indicates that an
opinion is already made and the MP uses the evaluation to justify a decision. Depending
on their openness to evidence, MPs demand evaluations to oppose or support a policy,
or to get information to aid a decision process. While opposition is characterized by the
MPs’ goal to eliminate or replace an existing policy, support aims to protect and keep
a policy. In contrast, the strategy information reveals nothing about the MPs’ attitude
towards the policy, apart from the fact that the MPs are seeking information on the issue.
Purpose: MPs pursue two main purposes when demanding an evaluation. Their goal
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is either to change an existing policy, or else to maintain the status quo, yet sensitize some
actors to it. While policy change is well established in public policy literature (Sabatier,
2006; Sabatier and Weible, 2014), policy awareness has rarely been discussed. In contrast
to policy change, policy awareness emphasizes the importance of a certain policy for a
specific group within society. Hence, it is more focused on maintaining the status quo - a
task, which is often just as important for MPs as changing a policy (Tsebelis, 1994, 131-
135). The purpose of the evaluation has an important effect on the MP’s motivation. With
both policy change and policy awareness, the MPs can try to satisfy their constituency or
their party.
In the following, I argue that the evaluation strategy is shaped by the MPs’ expected
benefit for a re-election from the perspective of their voters, and by the MPs’ perceived
party pressure in order to pursue the party’s preferred policy position. Depending on
their organizational allocation in the parliament, they will assume different legislative
roles and thus pursue certain strategies with evaluations. First, the MP’s memberships in
parliamentary committees provide legislative roles. On the one hand, MPs from legisla-
tive committees want to influence the legislation process by policy advocacy either based
on their voters’ or their parties’ preferences. They can achieve this by demanding an
evaluation, which provides evidence against an existing policy and serves as a basis for
a policy change, which is favored by their voters and their party. Moreover, they might
also demand an evaluation, which supports a MP’s preposition for a new policy by raising
awareness of this very policy. In doing so, they either make their constituency aware of
their personal work or of the work of their party. On the other hand, MPs of an oversight
committee want to appeal to their voters by displaying themselves as controllers of the
public administration to their constituency (Strøm, 2000; Bovens, 2005). Hence, they sub-
mit parliamentary requests in order to obtain information on a certain policy as well as to
fulfill their oversight function. Since they obtain information on a certain policy, they can
raise awareness of the effective, respectively ineffective policy without demanding a direct
policy change. This legislative role rather addresses the constituency than the party, since
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the latter’s preference depends on whether the party is part of the government or the
opposition. Therefore, I will test following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: MPs from legislative committees will more likely demand an
evaluation to oppose or support a policy than MPs from oversight commit-
tees; MPs from oversight committees will more likely demand an evaluation to
obtain information on a policy.
Second, the MPs’ choices of legislative roles also depend on their membership in a parlia-
mentary group. In order to foster their parties’ policy, MPs might point out how effectively
the policy works, as effectiveness is often regarded as a high legitimacy aspect (Scharpf,
1999; Widmer, 2009). In doing so, MPs seek evidence against or for a policy depending on
the party group membership. MPs from the same party group as the responsible Federal
Councillor will demand an evaluation to support a certain policy, while MPs from different
party groups will pursue the same strategy to oppose a policy in order to blame the polit-
ical opponent (Thesen, 2013). While the former want to maintain an existing policy and
raise awareness of the good work of their political group, the latter seek to make a policy
change. As a consequence, the MPs motivation lies in the realization of a certain policy
outcome or in the expectation of being rewarded by their party during the next election
- either by the re-nomination or else by a good position of the party list. Therefore, the
following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 2: MPs from the same party group as the responsible Federal
Councillor will more likely demand an evaluation to support a policy; MPs
from a different party group as the responsible Federal Councillor will more
likely demand an evaluation to oppose a policy.
The following section discusses the research design that this article uses to examine the
hypotheses. Since the analysis is based on a comparative case study, the section introduces
the case selection and gives an overview of the used data and methods.
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3.3 Research Design
The bases of the empirical analysis consist of twelve comparative case studies (Yin, 2014).
A case is defined as a parliamentary request, which has been submitted by a MP and
which demands an evaluation. The cases were selected by keeping as many indepen-
dent variables as possible constant, while the parliamentary requests differ in the MP’s
organizational allocation. First, the parliamentary requests vary in the MP’s commit-
tee membership: legislative or oversight committee.6 Second, I distinguish between the
parliamentary requests and the MP’s ideological affiliation. In doing so, I have com-
pared the party membership of the parliamentary request’s author (MP) and it’s recipient
(Federal Councillor). According to recent studies (Kriesi et al., 2006; Bornschier, 2015),
the main cleavage of the Swiss party system proceeds along the left (Social Democratic
Party, Green Party) and liberal-conservative parties (Christian Democratic People’s Party,
FDP.The Liberals, Swiss People’s Party). Although these MPs are not in the same party,
they are also worried about embarrassing their allied parties, since the federal election
allows list combination (Bochsler, 2010). The twelve cases were selected on the basis of
the study of Bundi et al. (2016)7 following the variation of committee and party group
membership. Moreover, I selected eight matching cases. The cases have the same author,
but differ in their context, since some MPs have changed their committee or have submit-
ted the parliamentary requests to different departments. According to King et al. (1994,
199-206), matching is one of the most valuable strategies to estimate the causal effect of
a variable, since most other control variables are held constant. The case selection in-
cluded parliamentary requests from both parliamentary chambers. Finally, the selected
cases differ in several other factors (e.g. political party, type of parliamentary request,
6MPs of oversight committees are often also members in a legislative committee, since the latter is
more frequent. I have allocated the MPs according to their statements within the interviews.
7Bundi et al. (2016) have identified all parliamentary requests, which demanded an evaluation in the
National Council and the Council of States between 2010 and 2014. Since 2010, between 33 and 45
parliamentary requests were submitted by MPs in order to demand an evaluation. However, only a small
number of motions are accepted within the chambers, while almost fifty percent of the postulates are
finally submitted to the Federal Council. Table 3.3 in the Appendix provides an overview of the demanded
evaluations.
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Table 3.1: Selected Cases of Parliamentary Requests
Legislative Committee Oversight Committee
Different (1) Stalking (Mot. 13.3742) (2) Supplementary Benefits (Post. 12.3673)
Party Group (5) Axpo (Inter. 14.3163) (11) Prevention Programs (Inter. 12.3498)
(7) New Buildings (Post. 13.3903) (10) Professional Integration (Quest. 10.1124)
Same (8) Gender Equality (Inter. 13.3270) (6) Poster Children (Inter. 11.4077)
Party Group (3) Lötschberg-Tunnel (Post. 11.3626) (12) Federal ICT-Projects (Post. 13.4062)
(9) Doctor Admission (Post. 12.3218) (4) Regional Policy (Post. 11.3697)
Note: Mot. = Motion; Inter. = Interpellation; Post. = Postulate; Quest. = Question; Number of Case in
parentheses.
federal department). Table 3.1 shows an overview of the selected cases. Although MPs
from legislative committees submitted more parliamentary requests, MPs from oversight
committees have more submissions in relation to their size, since the number of oversight
committees is smaller than that of legislative committees. In addition, MPs tend to sub-
mit more requests to Federal Councillors, which are from a different party group. The
parliamentary requests are distributed as follows: 79 (36.2%) legislative committee and
different party group, 73 (33.5%) legislative committee and same party group, 38 (17.4%)
oversight committee and different party group, and 28 (12.8%) oversight committee and
same party group.8
In order to investigate the cases, I gathered data from a document analysis as well as
from guideline-based interviews (Bailer, 2014).9 In doing so, I analyzed the text of each
parliamentary request, which is available in the database of the parliament (Bundesver-
sammlung, 2016). The database reveals the full text of the parliamentary request, its
author, the date of submission, the responsible government department, and a short justi-
fication. The guideline-based interviews with the MPs were conducted during March 2016.
The study uses a causal-process observation so as to test the influence of the parliamentary
allocation on the strategy of policy evaluations. According to Brady and Collier (2010,
318), causal-process observation is "an insight or piece of data that provides information
8More details to the cases can be found in Table 3.4 in the Appendix.
9One interview was conducted per email, since the MP only had limited time resources (Case 3).
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about context, process, or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive leverage in causal
inference". I focus on mechanism causal-process observation, which provides information
about whether an intervening event posited by the theory can be observed (Mahoney,
2010, 128-129). The study reconstructs the process of parliamentary requests demanding
an evaluation with the help of the interviews and analyses of what factors lead to the
specific strategy of the evaluation.
3.4 Findings
Table 3.2 presents an overview of the findings of the case studies. The case studies show
that the evaluations were mainly used in order to oppose (7) or to obtain information on
a policy (4). Only one MP demanded an evaluation in order to support a policy. In order
to illustrate the mechanisms of causality behind these variables, the next sections provide
detailed information from the case studies.
In total, seven parliamentary requests were submitted by a MP of a legislative com-
mittee, which aimed to oppose a policy (Cases 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). In the parliamentary
request "Stalking" (Case 1), a prosecutor called the MP’s attention to unavailable possi-
bilities of punishment against stalking. In addition, the MP was dismayed by the stalking
accusation against the former Chief of Army. Although he admitted some of the stalking
accusation, the charge was dismissed. As a consequence, the MP deeply believed that the
existing policy was useless to persecute stalking. "This situation could have been solved
with a particular article on stalking, as other countries would know already, e.g. Germany
(Case 1 - oral interview).10 According to her, the legal basis failed to protect victims of
stalking. The evaluation should have confirmed her information and should have exerted
pressure on the Federal Council to take action. The other cases are similar, since the MPs
aimed to demonstrate that an existing policy has failed and that one should consider a
policy change. The parliamentary request "Lötschberg-Tunnel" demanded an evaluation
in order to assess the safety of the tunnel and to oppose the current stage of the tunnel.
10Original in German or French, author’s own translation (applies for all following quotations).
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However, in the MP’s opinion it was clear that the report would show that an extension
of the tunnel was also necessary due to capacity reasons. In her argumentation of the
parliamentary request, she makes clear that the evaluation of the current situation of the
Lötschberg Tunnel can only lead to the conclusion that an extension is inevitable. Hence,
the MP was not really interested in obtaining information on the tunnel, but rather in
seeking ammunition for her policy change, since she opposed the current state of the tun-
nel. In addition, a parliamentary request can also oppose a policy by trying to make the
government aware of a problem. The parliamentary request "Foster Children" demanded
the Federal Council to assess the placement of foster children to foster families. Since
private companies participate in this market, the MP feared that the well being of the
children would be in danger. "My main focus was to persuade the Federal Council to
change the regulation on foster children" (Case 6 - oral interview). The administration
would have needed to deal with the topic, since they are obliged to answer the questions
in the interpellations. In order to write a reply, the public servants would need to read up
on the subject of foster children, and recognize that there would be a problem.
While most parliamentary requests aimed to oppose an existing policy by illustrating
its failure in the evaluation reports, only one parliamentary request aimed to support a
policy (Case 11). The parliamentary request "Prevention Programs" aimed to highlight
the relevance of the Federal Prevention Programs Tobacco, Alcohol, and Diet & Exercise,
which had been extended by the Federal Council in the current year. In doing so, the
request asked about the most positive points of an evaluation that had been conducted on
the prevention programs the year before (Balthasar et al., 2011; Von Stokar et al., 2011).
The MP aimed to link the positive results to the prevention bill, which was connected
to the prevention programs. "I expected some support from the evaluation results with
regard to the vote on the prevention bill. Hence, I wanted the Swiss upper chamber to
be aware of the good work by the policy" (Case 11 - oral interview). Thus, the MP did
not directly demand an evaluation, but wanted to discuss an already existing evaluation
report in order to gain support for a similar bill.
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Note: Support for the hypotheses in parentheses in row committee and party group (yes/no)
In addition, four parliamentary requests aimed to collect information about a policy
(Cases 2, 4, 10 and 12). In the parliamentary request "supplementary benefits", the MP
made it clear that he was not against the supplementary benefits with the social insurances
IV and AHV. However, he observed that the costs highly increased after the rearrangement
of the fiscal equalization scheme between the Swiss cantons. He assumed that the reason
behind this increase could be found in the long-term care insurance. Since he was not
entirely sure, he demanded an evaluation in order to obtain information on the reason
behind the supplementary benefits. "I hoped that the report would give me and my
67
colleagues an idea about what type of action we should take regarding the supplementary
benefits" (Case 2 - oral interview). The parliamentary request "Federal ICT-Projects"
aimed to illustrate similar behavior patterns, as the MP knew that the ICT projects were
poorly managed, but he was missing the information to demand a policy change, so he
wanted to give the Federal Council the possibility to adjust the management of the ICT
projects. "I did not want to question the process. My goal was to make the Federal Council
document and monitor the ICT process, so that one can avoid a mismanagement" (Case
12 - oral interview). The parliamentary request "Regional Policy" demanded an evaluation
on the effectiveness and implementation of the new regional policy. The evaluation should
include non-governmental experts as well as representatives of the mountain regions and
should explicitly be addressed to the Federal Assembly. "The introduction of the new
regional policy (...) has extensive consequences for the mountain regions, which are difficult
to foresee for the relevant authorities and the population " (Case 4 - written request). The
MP would aim to find out whether the mountain regions were negatively affected by the
new policy and whether one needed to change anything. Since he was a representative
of the mountain regions, he wanted to know whether he would need to attempt any new
policy, if the policy failed to serve the mountain regions.
The analysis suggests that the committee membership plays a crucial role for the choice
of strategy. While MPs of oversight committees tend to ask for evaluations in order to
obtain information (Cases 2, 4, 10, 12), legislative committee members demand evaluations
in order to oppose an existing policy (Cases 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9). However, the case
studies do not provide evidence for the influence of legislative committee members on the
strategy to support a policy. In contrast, the case studies show no party group effect. In
only three cases (Cases 1, 5, 7), did a MP from another party group than the responsible
Federal Councillor aim to oppose a policy, while four parliamentary requests (Cases 3,
6, 8, 9) pursued an opposition of the policy, although the MP and Federal Council were
from the same party group. Moreover, the only supportive evaluations were submitted
by a MP from another party group. The double cases 5 and 6 display the missing effect
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of the party group. Although the parliamentary requests were submitted to two different
Federal Councillors by the same MP (one from the same party, the other from another
party group), they both pursued the same goal to oppose a policy.
3.5 Discussion
The case studies suggest that the membership in a legislative or oversight committee
shapes the MPs evaluation strategy significantly, while the party group of a Federal Coun-
cillor does not seem to have an effect. In doing so, the difference between legislative and
oversight committee members lies in their use of evaluations. According to the case stud-
ies, the MPs from legislative committees mainly interpret an evaluation as means to an
end, since their main objective is to influence the policy agenda in order to appear as a
policy advocate. This becomes apparent in the statement of one MP: "The evaluation
should have come out so that it confirms the information that I already had" (Case 1 -
oral interview). In contrast, all MPs from oversight committees emphasize that they are
more aware of evaluations and parliamentary oversight in general due to their member-
ship in an oversight committee. Previous studies have shown that MPs from oversight
committees demand evaluations more often (Speer et al., 2015; Bundi, 2016). Evaluations
were important instruments for parliamentary oversight and they would be necessary to
fulfill their oversight function. One MP highlighted that evaluations are elementary to
understand the processes of a policy, since the administration has to provide information
on the implementation of it. As a consequence, they position themselves in a different
way. One MP explained that he cannot distinguish himself with issues from parliamen-
tary oversight, but he can do so more generally as a MP who controls the government. On
the contrary, MPs from legislative committees tend to have a stronger focus on the policy
agenda. Although those MPs argued that parliamentary oversight is important, they ad-
mitted to not being very aware of the function and relinquish these tasks to the specific
committees. If they demand evaluations, they want to influence the political agenda. This
finding partly confirms the study of Zwaan et al. (2016, 15), who argues that MPs of the
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European Parliament demand evaluations for an ex ante agenda-setting outlook by asking
about information on actions that must be taken.
In contrast to the committee membership, the membership in a specific party group
does not influence the evaluation strategy. During the interviews, almost all MPs empha-
sized that the party membership of the responsible government member would not play
a role for the submission of the request. One MP stated that the own Federal Council-
lors were not under preservation order. This would especially be the case for the Council
of the States where the party orientation would be less important than in the National
Council. Though, some MPs argued that the communication between the MP and the
Federal Councillor would be easier. A MP stated that if the Federal Councillor had been
from her party, the person might have informed her about the limited acceptance chances
within the Federal Council. From time to time, Federal Councillors call the MP’s atten-
tion to specific issues, so that they have the possibility to become active. However, these
MPs must not necessarily belong to the same party, as one MP explained. In addition,
several MPs emphasized that the Federal Council is a collective board in which the de-
cisions are taken together with the other members. Another very important point is the
Federal Councillor’s agenda. Even if the Federal Councillor is from the same party, a
parliamentary request could potentially interfere with the coherent strategy of the Federal
Councillor.
The missing influence of the party group membership might be explained by several
factors. On the one hand, an evaluation is often perceived by MPs as something very
technical, which makes it less attractive for party ideological strategy. One MP argued
that from time to time there are parliamentary requests, which aim to oppose a policy in
order to harm the political opponent. However, the process of an evaluation would be too
complicated to realize that. Evaluations should be neutral, as they are independently con-
ducted and provide information for specific questions. As a consequence, one MP argued
that if he had to harm the other parties, he would have done it more straightforwardly.
On the other hand, the Swiss political system is characterized by a strong consensual
70
democracy, which integrates all major parties in the government and makes oppositional
behavior in the parliament unusual (Lijphart, 2012). Moreover, the national parties are
almost absent during the national election campaigns. Since parties in Switzerland are
mainly a loose confederation of cantonal parties, the federal party is less important for the
reelection of an individual MP (Linder, 2012, 83-85).11 Hence, MPs have fewer incentives
to please the own national party.
Although the case studies do not provide evidence for an influence of a party group,
they still illustrate how MPs react to electoral vulnerability with parliamentary requests.
First and most important, the committee membership provides an opportunity for MPs
to present themselves in a specific role to their constituency. Second, in seven of twelve
presented cases, an interest group was the trigger behind the parliamentary request, which
demanded an evaluation. Switzerland has a strong reputation for the importance of inter-
est groups, since the central state is underdeveloped and the national parties are weak due
to limited resources. In contrast, interest groups are well equipped and also institutionally
recognized by public authorities (Gava et al., 2017, 2). According to Giger and Klüver
(2016), some types of interest groups even influence the link between MPs and their vot-
ers. Since interest groups are so powerful, they are also important for MPs in order to get
re-elected. Therefore, MPs seek their support when they submit parliamentary requests.
In case 4 "Regional Policy" and case 10 "Professional Integration", interest groups played
an important role. Both MPs had been approached by interest groups, which reported
that a policy had been changed and that some part of society might be disadvantaged.
Since the effects of the policy were uncertain, the MPs demanded an evaluation in order
to obtain more precise information.
However, this study has some limitations. First and most important, since the analysis
is based on a comparative case study with small n, the external validity has to be discussed
(Yin, 2014, 48-49). Still, the case selection provided a solid basis in order to assume that
the findings are generalizable beyond this study. Second, one has to consider that the
11However, Bochsler et al. (2016) argues that Switzerland shows a trend towards a stronger national-
ization of the party system.
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least likely case strategy finds its empirical constraints regarding the influence of the
party group. While the case studies suggest that the membership in a party group does
not determine the strategy of a policy evaluation, there is also the possibility that the
characteristics of the Swiss political system are simply too weak to show an effect. On
the one hand, Bailer and Bütikofer (2015) show that the power of parliamentary groups
is still rather limited. On the other hand, most Swiss MPs are still characterized as semi-
professional and pursue an occupation or activity outside of their parliamentary mandate
(Bütikofer, 2014; Bundi et al., 2017). This means that MPs are relatively independent,
which might lead to individual decisions regarding the evaluation demand. Last, the
study did not take timing into account, which might have a strong influence on the MPs
motivation for reelection (Fujimura, 2016). Parliamentary requests at the end of the
legislative term might be more strongly affected by electoral campaigning compared to
those in the beginning. Still, the case studies do not provide any evidence that time was
an issue, which attenuates the argument that MPs seek reelection with parliamentary
requests. However, several interviewed MPs stated that it is almost impossible to predict
when the request is discussed with the parliamentary arena.
3.6 Conclusion
Policy evaluations are an important tool for the legislative and oversight function of MPs
(Lees, 1977; Weiss, 1989). This article has investigated which strategies MPs pursue
with evaluations by looking at twelve parliamentary requests at the Swiss Federal Assem-
bly between 2010 and 2014. The analysis found that MPs from legislative committees
demand evaluations in order to oppose a policy, while MPs from oversight committees
request evaluations to obtain information on policies. In contrast, the evaluation strategy
is not dependent on the party membership of the MP, which submits the parliamentary
request, and the Federal Councillor, who is responsible for responding to it. The findings
suggest that parliamentary requests are elementary for MPs in order to appeal to their
constituency and to some extent to their party by adopting legislative roles. Depending
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on the focus within parliament, the MPs choose different strategies to promote themselves
in the public. According to the cases, the appeal to the voters is more important for MPs
than for their own party. These findings provide new insights in how electoral vulnerability
shapes legislative behavior.
This study has made important contributions to research on evaluation. In general,
literature on research on evaluation has mainly dealt with the use of evaluations and
has neglected the origins of evaluation up to now (Weiss, 1998; Kirkhart, 2000; Patton,
2008; Johnson et al., 2009). Moreover, scholars have completely left the parliament as a
demander of evaluations out of the discussion, although parliamentarians are important
stakeholders of evaluations. This article builds on the findings of previous research showing
that parliaments frequently demand evaluation reports (Speer et al., 2015; Bundi, 2016;
Zwaan et al., 2016). In addition, it shows that MPs pursue different strategies with evalu-
ation. Mark and Henry (2004) discuss the outcomes of evaluation influences. In doing so,
they present a schematic theory of evaluation influence building on the traditional under-
standing of the evaluation’s role in the service of social betterment. This study is able to
confirm that evaluations are used for cognitive (e.g. agenda setting), and behavioral out-
comes (e.g. policy adoption) that might lead to social betterment, as well as showing that
MPs also use evaluations in order to achieve personal goals, for instance being reelected.
Hence, this study shows that evaluation use must not be restricted to the use of findings
(Alkin and King, 2016).
This finding results in a different understanding of evaluation use. Weiss (1999, 477)
has argued that evaluators often find it hard to understand why policy makers - including
MPs - do not transfer evaluation results directly to the legislation. This study provides
an answer to this question regarding the parliamentary arena. Evaluation is not only
a tool to learn about a policy, but also to control how a policy becomes implemented.
Since evaluations help MPs to oversee the government, they contribute to democracy by
strengthening the parliament in their oversight function. In order to make evaluations
more relevant for parliaments, evaluators should emphasize the aspect of accountability of
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an evaluation. Even if parliaments rarely use evaluations for evidence-based policy making,
they still rely on them. MPs demand evaluations in order to confirm their opinion or in
order to obtain information for the assessment of a policy. Hence, MPs use the evaluation
as an instrument for their purposes rather than making use of the actual findings from the
evaluation report. I hope that this understanding of how MPs use evaluations will take
roots amongst scholars of research on evaluation.
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Appendix
Table 3.3: Submitted Parliamentary Requests for Evaluations, 2010-2014
Parliamentary Request 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014*
Motion 6(1) 7(1) 0(0) 2(0) 3(0)
Postulate 6(3) 8(4) 12(6) 7(3) 4(1)
Interpellation 27 15 27 24 19
Question 3 4 6 3 2
Total 42 33 45 36 28
Note: 2014 covers the submitted parliamentary requests until June 20, 2014. Number of accepted motions
and postulates in parentheses. Information provided for the National Council and the Council of States.
Source: Bundi et al. (2016)
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Table 3.4: Detailed Information about the Selected Parliamentary Requests
Case
No.














































































































































Parliamentarians’ Strategies for Policy Evaluations
Supplementary Case Description
Introduction
The following section presents the description of the twelve comparative case studies that
were analyzed in the article for Evaluation and Program Planning (Bundi, 2017). The
section shall provide more detailed information on the cases in order to make the results
of the comparative analysis more transparent. The case studies are mainly based on
guideline-based interviews with MPs, which were conducted during March 2016 and were
complemented with a document analysis of the parliamentary requests. The following
sections reveal the background of the proposal, the actors which were involved and fostered
the submission, as well as the strategy and purpose of the evaluation which was proposed
in the parliamentary request. Furthermore, the sections also show the response of the
Federal Council and the consequences of the demanded evaluation, as well as whether
the parliamentary requests correspond with the hypothesis in the comparative analysis of
the article. Finally, the last section discusses further observations and Tables 3.5 and 3.6
provide a summary of all cases.
Case 1: Stop Procrastinating Stalking (Motion 13.3742)
The origin of the motion goes back to 2008, when the MP submitted a parliamentary
request12 in order to introduce a legal basis to prosecute stalking. This request was
mainly driven by the affair ’Roland Nef’ who used to be the chief of the Swiss Army
and was accused of stalking his ex-wife.13 The MP stated that the affair ’Roland Nef’
had deeply shocked her and that since then, she has been lobbying for the topic. In the
meantime, her attention was called to the legal background of stalking by a professional
prosecutor, whom she knew personally. According to this prosecutor, the law would not
12Motion 08.3495 "Stalking".
13Büchi, J. 2015. September 22. Stalker sollen härter bestraft werden. Retrieved from 20min.ch.
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allow judges to penalize stalking. However, that problem could have been solved with a
particular article on stalking, as other countries already know (e.g. Germany). According
to the MP, the current law failed to protect victims of stalking. Despite the fact that
the National Council accepted the parliamentary request in 2008, the Council of States
refused the proposal in 2010 and argued that an article, which provided a legal basis to
help stalking victims already existed. This article14 had been freshly introduced in 2007
and the Federal Council, which also suggested to refuse the motion, promised in their
response to the MP that they would commission an evaluation of the article after five
years. Since the evaluation report had not been commissioned by September 2013, the
MP submitted a new motion in order to urge the Federal Council to present the Federal
Assembly with the evaluation, as promised, and to discuss new measures against stalking.
The strategy of the MP’s evaluation request was to obtain evidence to oppose the
current policy. In doing so, the MP stated that her most important goal was to have
the Federal Council supply the evaluation later. She was under the impression that the
Federal Council procrastinated the evaluation report for reasons unknown to her. She was
very confident that the evaluation would show that the legal basis to persecute stalking
was not sufficient and that a stalking article was needed. In other words, the MP expected
a confirmation of the information that she had already obtained from the prosecutor. In
her opinion, the additional evidence from the evaluation would convince the Council of
the States to revise their opinion on the necessity of a stalking article. Since she was sure
about the outcome of the evaluation, she wanted to use the evaluation to convince other
MPs. In doing so, the evaluation should especially target the Council of States and the
Federal Council, which both had previously refused a stalking article.
Although the Federal Council shared the MP’s opinion in their response that the legal
basis for stalking was insufficient, they rejected the MP’s motion. According to their
answer, the evaluation was initiated in 2013 and the report was expected to be published
a year later. The Federal Council wanted to wait until the evaluation report was published
14Art 28b ZGB, SR 2010.
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before any specific measures were taken. Indeed, the evaluation on the implementation and
impact of the article 28b was published in 2015, pointing out that the Article 28b would
insufficiently protect victims of stalking, since civil protection could not be enforced by the
police (Gloor et al., 2015). Soon after, the National council accepted the motion and the
decision was delegated to the Council of States. However, the Council of States rejected
the motion yet again and followed the Federal Council’s recommendations. During the
debate, Federal Councillor Simonetta Sommaruga argued that the Federal Council would
use the results of the evaluation in order to present a revision of the present article 28b.
In doing so, the Federal Council decided not to introduce a new bill, but to improve the
current legal basis, so that stalking could be prosecuted more easily. Overall, the MP was
disappointed by the Council of States’ vote. Surprisingly, the MP only briefly took note of
the evaluation report, albeit the report actually supported her claims. Although the MP
was not successful with the introduction of a stalking article, the parliamentary request
was one factor that fostered the realization of the planned evaluation on stalking.
The case supports both hypotheses. On the one hand, the MP clearly stated that she
wanted to have the evaluation done in order to oppose the current legal article which did
not provide sufficient protection against stalking. As the MP assumed that the evaluation
report would support her position, she fostered the evaluation in order to obtain evidence
to convince the Federal Council and the Council of States of her policy proposal. On
the other hand, the MP and the responsible Federal Councillor do not belong to the
same party, which corroborated with the second hypothesis. However, the MP did not
demand the evaluation in order to harm the Federal Councillor. Instead, she argued that
the communication might had been better between her and the Federal Council if the
Councillor had belonged to the same party. Thus, the case supports the hypothesis, but
presents another theoretical explanation for the reason behind the evaluation.
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Case 2: Supplementary Benefits for AHV and IV. Perspectives 2020 (Postulate 12.3673)
The system of supplementary benefits changed fundamentally during the course of the
rearrangement of the national fiscal equalization (NFA)15 in 2008. In doing so, the costs
have increased significantly over time and have amounted to 4.275 billion Swiss Francs
(Bundesamt für Sozialversicherungen, 2016). In contrast, the costs for the old-age and
survivors’ insurance (AHV) and the disability insurance (IV) pensions decreased during
the same time. Thus, the MP assumed that a connection between these two developments
must exist.16 Since the MP is a qualified insurance salesman, he had been involved in the
Swiss social security system for almost forty years, particularly in financial precautions.
Hence, he had developed a strong interest for this topic and therefore he was deeply
worried about the recent developments of the supplementary benefits’ costs. Moreover,
the revision of the pension system was planned for 2020. Therefore, the MP wanted a
report, which investigated the consequences of the policy change. The report should be
part of the next effectiveness report of the NFA and should present the perspectives of the
supplementary benefits until 2020.
The MP demanded the evaluation to obtain information in order to make adjustments
in the revision of the pension system. Although he assumed that the reason behind the
increase of the supplementary benefits was the long-term care insurance, the MP was
not completely sure about the exact relationship. He hoped that the report would give
himself and his colleagues an idea about what type of action they should take regarding
the supplementary benefits. Overall, the MP’s goal was to make the parliament aware of
this development, which was a result of the policy change in 2008. Since he was interested
in the information, he hoped that the parliament would draw the right conclusion from
15The national fiscal equalization is a compensation system between the individual cantons in Switzer-
land and the Confederation, which supports cantons, which are worse off due to resources, geographical-
topographical and sociodemographic differences (Bundesgesetz über den Finanz- und Lastenausgleich,
FiLaG, SR 613.2).
16The old-age and survivors’ insurance (AHV) and the disability insurance (IV), together with the
supplementary benefits, build the first pillow of the compulsory pension insurance in Switzerland (Bundes-
gesetz über die Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung AHVG, SR 831.10, Bundesgesetz über die Invali-
denversicherung, IVG, SR 831.20 and Bundesgesetz über Ergänzungsleistungen zur Alters-, Hinterlassenen-
und Invalidenversicherung).
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the report. The MP saw reports as a basis of the political work, which indicates what
the parliament has to do and which actions should be implemented in the legislation.
However, he also emphasized the oversight role of the parliament. Since the parliament
cannot monitor all activities of the authorities, they have to focus on the most important
issues. According to the MP, the strong increase of supplementary benefits is a highly
important issue, which should be evaluated.
The Federal Council replied to the MP that they shared his view on the necessity of
a report on causes of the supplementary benefits’ increase over the last years. However,
the government preferred the report not to be allocated to the next effectiveness report of
the NFA for the period 2012-2015, but rather in an independent report, since there were
also other parliamentary requests on this issue.17 Since the Council of States supported
the postulate, the Federal Council presented a report on the supplementary benefits of the
AHV and IV in 2013, which partly supported the MP’s hypothesis on the relationship be-
tween the policy change in 2008 and the cost developments (Bundesrat, 2013). Hence, the
MP declared himself satisfied with the fulfillment of the request. In June 2014, the Fed-
eral Council announced that it planned a revision of the supplementary benefits’ system.
However, the MP had not yet undertaken any action, since the revision of supplementary
benefits was still in the consultation phase.18
While the case provides evidence for the first hypothesis, it does not show any evidence
for the second one. According to the MP, the main goal of the evaluation was to generate
an information basis for future decisions. He only assumed a relationship between the
decrease of the costs for the AHV und IV on the one side, and the increase of costs of
the supplementary benefits on the other side, but wanted to be sure about the causal
relationship. In contrast, there is no evidence that shows that the MP wants to blame
the Federal Councillor for the ineffective policy. The MP argued that the funding of the
17Postulate 12.3602 "Reform der Ergänzungsleistungen zu AHV/IV" and postulate 12.3677 "Kein Blind-
flug bei den Ergänzungsleistungen zu AHV/IV".
18The consultation phase of the revision started in November 2015 and ended in March 2016. Federal
Social Insurance Office. 2015. November 25. Die Reform der Ergänzungsleistungen sichert das Leis-
tungsniveau. Retrieved from news.admin.ch.
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social insurances was as a problem that was bigger than ideological positions.
Case 3: Consequences of the Simplon Tunnel Fire for the Lötschberg-Tunnel (Postulate
11.3626)19
The parliamentary request was submitted in the course of a fire occurring in the Simplon
Tunnel in June 2006.20 Due to the fact that the tunnel has two individual tubes, the
traffic was not completely blocked, but heavily jammed for several days. The MP argued
that a similar incident would harm the Lötschberg Tunnel, which connects the cantons
Berne and Valais, as there would be no possibility of evading to a second tube. In the long
term, a double-track of the Lötschberg Tunnel would also be necessary to increase the
capacity and to keep the timetable stable. Moreover, the current infrastructure would not
be sufficient in the case of an emergency, which is why the MP demanded an evaluation of
the current situation. Hence, the request commissioned the Federal Council to elaborate
a new assessment of the necessity of the completion of the Lötschberg-Tunnel for security
reasons. In doing so, the report should evaluate the fitness for purpose of the current
status of the Lötschberg-Tunnel. The motivation for the request was partly based on an
informal interest group, as the parliamentary request was mainly supported by MPs from
the region of the Lötschberg-Tunnel, the canton of Valais.
According to the MP, the parliamentary request’s aim was to oppose the Federal Coun-
cil’s current strategy, which would not include an expansion of the Lötschberg-Tunnel. The
MP declared that she hoped for a clear statement on the usefulness of the tunnel’s ex-
pansion. She said that these days the need for the second tube was even more evident,
since the tunnel was reaching its capacity limits: If the transfer of goods to other modes of
transport should be promoted, and if you would not want to restrict passenger transporta-
tion, the expansion would be necessary despite the commissioning of the new Gotthard
Base Tunnel. In her argumentation of the parliamentary request, she makes clear that the
19The interview for this parliamentary request was conducted via email due to the limited time resources
of the MP.
20Schmid, A. 2011. June 10. Güterzug brennt in Simplontunnel. Retrieved from nzz.ch.
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evaluation of the current situation of the Lötschberg-Tunnel can only lead to the conclu-
sion that an expansion would be inevitable. Hence, the MP was not really interested in
the actual information on the tunnel, but rather in receiving crucial facts, which she could
use for her policy proposal, since she supported the expansion of the current tunnel.
The Federal Council suggested to reject the proposal, since they did not see the basis
for such a report. The Simplon Tunnel was only closed for four days and the trains
were redirected to other routes. The government argued that in the case of a fire in the
Lötschberg Tunnel, the rail traffic would remain guaranteed due to the route Frutigen-Brig,
which is double-tracked. Moreover, the Federal Council argued that the tunnel complied
with the newest safety rules, which is why they did not see any necessity to evaluate
the safety concept of the tunnel. The National Council followed the Federal Council’s
suggestion and rejected the parliamentary request. The MP showed disappointment in
the Federal Council’s decision as well as in the parliamentary vote.
Again, the case provides evidence for the first hypothesis. Since the MP devoutly
believed that the capacity of the Lötschberg Tunnel has to be increased for security reasons,
the evaluation was motivated in order to support her claim. She hoped that the report
would urge the Federal Council to change its current infrastructure strategy. On the
contrary, the MP demanded the evaluation in order to oppose the current policy despite
being a member of the same party as the responsible Federal Councillor. However, the
origin of the different policy preferences was not different ideological positions, but rather
the regional interests that influenced the demand for the evaluation.
Case 4: Evaluation of the New Regional Policy (Postulate 11.3697)
The new regional policy21 was introduced in 2008, which replaced the bill on the investment
aid for mountain regions (Investionshilfegesetz). The policy’s aim was to support the
infrastructure tasks for financial communities in the mountainous regions. Shortly after the
policy change in 2008, the MP was contacted by a former National Councillor, who, during
21Bundesgesetz über Regionalpolitik, SR 901.
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that time, represented an interest group, which focuses on the Swiss Alpine economy. Since
the representatives of the mountain regions were not quite able to assess the consequences
of the policy change, they wanted to initiate an evaluation, which should observe the
outcomes of the new policy. However, the idea behind the evaluation was not only to
assess the consequences of the new regional policy for the authorities and for the people of
the mountain regions, but also to see whether the new policy was implemented properly
and whether the regions were receiving enough financial support. Moreover, the MP
argued that a new regional program was planned for the time period between 2016 and
2023, and an evaluation of the situation would be necessary in order to assess whether the
needs of the mountain regions were satisfied with the new policy. Hence, the evaluation
should include non-governmental experts as well as representatives of the mountain regions
and should explicitly be addressed to the Federal Assembly.
According to the MP, with the results of the evaluation he aimed to gain insight
on whether the mountain regions were being negatively affected by the new policy and
whether any action would be required. As a representative of the mountain regions, he
wanted to know whether he needed to attempt any new policy, in case the policy was failing
to serve the mountain regions. Another objective was also to influence the questions of the
evaluation. An evaluation clause was integrated in the regional policy and the MP knew
that an evaluation was going to be conducted during the legislation period. Hence, the
MP was very interested in incorporating questions into the planned evaluation, since he
wanted to have an information basis on the consequences of the policy change. According
to the MP, the focus of the evaluation should have been on the effectiveness of the policy.
Although the financial resources were reasonable, one should have checked whether they
were being used in an effective way. The addressee of the parliamentary request should
rather have been the Federal Council and its agencies than the parliament. The MP
wanted to raise the Federal Council’s awareness for the consequences of the regional policy
change. Since there was no information so far on this issue, the goal of the evaluation was
to provide some insight on this matter.
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The Federal Council supported the postulate and adverted to the planned evaluation
for 2013. Hence, the National Council also voted for the MP’s proposal. The Federal
Council presented several evaluation reports regarding the effectiveness and implementa-
tion of the new regional policy (Kägi et al., 2013; Sager et al., 2013; Zumbusch et al.,
2013; Rühl et al., 2014; Zumbusch et al., 2014). In addition, the Swiss Audit Office has
also conducted two evaluations on the new regional policy about its implementation in
the cantons Bern, Jura and Valais (Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle , 2012), and about its
funding (Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle, 2014). All evaluations considered some aspects
of the MP’s request. As the Federal Council considered the request as fulfilled, the postu-
late was amortized in 2015. However, the MP did not take note of the evaluations despite
the multitude of reports. He argued that the interest groups would have let him know if
the evaluation had not been satisfactory to them. Moreover, he would also be indignant
over the 1 million Swiss Francs, which were reserved for the conduction of evaluations for
the regional policy during the time period from 2016 to 2023 (Bundesversammlung, 2015).
The case supports the first hypotheses on the influence of the oversight committee.
Although the MP was concerned about the benefits of the mountain regions, he seemed
very open towards the results of the evaluation. The most important goal was to obtain
information about the consequences of the regional policy, and he felt responsible to oversee
the new policy in order to ensure that the policy serves its voters. In contrast, the case
provides no evidence for the second hypothesis. Both the MP and the Federal Council
belong to a center-right party group, but there was no sign that this fact played any role
for the demand of the evaluation. Moreover, the MP would not undertake any action to
stress the good work of the government after the publication of the evaluation, although
the evaluation presented the new regional policy in a good light.
Case 5: Is Axpo Going to Be the Next Swissair or UBS? (Interpellation 14.3163)
In 2007, Switzerland negotiated a bilateral agreement with the EU in the electricity sector
in order to gain access to the European electricity market. However, the EU suspended
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all negotiations after the Swiss population accepted the popular initiative Against Mass
Immigration22 in 2014. According to the MP, this suspension might have major impacts
on the Swiss electricity industry. Axpo was planning to make an expensive investment in
order to pursue business within the European electricity market. The risk was that the EU
would organize their electricity strategy excluding Switzerland and that Axpo would not be
able to refund their investment and thus could potentially become insolvent. Since Axpo is
owned by the public, the company would represent a financial hazard for the cantons and
the tax payers, as previously observed in the case of the former airline Swissair.23 Hence,
the request demanded the Federal Council to assess the risks of the Swiss electricity
industry after the suspension of the electricity agreement with the European Union in
2014. The MP particularly focused on the energy company Axpo, since it is owned by the
public (Swiss cantons). The MP claimed that regarding the energy supply, Axpo was "too
big to fail" and that the policy would fail to prevent such occurrences.
The MP demanded the evaluation in order to make the Federal Council aware of the
risk, which Axpo could potentially imply for the Swiss tax payer. She used to be a member
of the legislative committee of transport and telecommunication for more than ten years
and was especially interested in topics related to infrastructure. In the course of this
membership, she had been in Brussels at the European Union several times in order to
exchange with members of the European Parliament, who also dealt with infrastructure
issues. She was told that the European electricity market could develop independently
from Switzerland’s participation. Hence, she feared that if Switzerland was not part of the
European electricity market, Axpo’s financial investments could not be regained. She was
sure that a possible evaluation would show that the current policy would potentially allow
a dangerous situation for the Federal Confederation as well as for the cantons. Hence, her
22The popular initiative was launched by the SVP and aims to limit immigration through quotas. The
EU claims that immigration quotas contradict the free movement of persons between Switzerland and the
EU, which was stipulated in the bilateral treaties. Hence, the EU has suspended all current negotiations
until this contentious issue is settled between Switzerland and the EU.
23Swissair used to be the national carrier of Switzerland from 1931 until its insolvency in October
2001. When Swissair went bankrupt, the Confederation aided the airline with an emergency credit of
1,15 billion Swiss Francs from which the Confederation only retrieved 220 million (SDA. May 5th, 2016.
Swissair-Darlehen. Bund erhält 220 Millionen Franken zurück. Retrieved from nzz.ch).
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evaluation strategy was to oppose the current policy, even though she admitted that she
did not have a policy proposal, which would solve this problem. However, she insisted
that the government made an effort so that Switzerland would become integrated in the
European electricity market.
The Federal Council took the interpellation seriously, since its response was unusually
long. However, it argued that Axpo is a corporation owned by the public, but the respon-
sibility for the strategic direction of the company and thus for positioning against risks
lies with the Board and at the General Assembly of their respective companies. Moreover,
the Federal Council referred to the evaluation of the commission of experts, which argued
that only the two banks Credit Suisse and UBS would represent a financial risk for the
Swiss economy (Bundesrat, 2010). As a consequence, the Federal Council was not willing
to take any actions. The MP was disappointed about the reply, although she was partly
able to understand it.
The case seems to support both hypotheses. On the one hand, the MP argued that the
evaluation report should have provided evidence to oppose the current situation around
the company Axpo, which was a policy failure in her opinion. Despite having a clear stand
on the current policy, she did not present an alternative policy, but wished to delegate the
possible to changes to the government. Thus, the argumentation of the first hypothesis
only partly plays a role. In addition, the argumentation of the second hypothesis does
not come across in this case, either. The MP and the responsible Federal Councillor are
indeed from different party groups, but the MP did not seek to blame the Federal Council
for the policy failure. Instead, she tried to make the government aware of the situation,
so that they can revise the policy by themselves.
Case 6: Stop Making Profit with Foster Children (Interpellation 11.4077)
During 2011, various media24 reported that local authorities largely delegated the place-
ment of foster children as well as the monitoring of foster care to private intermediary
24Polli, T. November 24th, 2011. Das ist Kinderhandel. Retrieved from beobachter.ch. Mantel, A.
September 3rd, 2011. Ein eigenes Kind von fremden Eltern. Retrieved from derbund.ch.
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organizations; so-called family placement organizations. However, the number of equivo-
cal actors was said to have strongly increased in the last years. Moreover, most of these
recruitment firms are said to focus on their own profit, therefore a significant part of the
invested money is not invested in the future of children, but flows into the pockets of
business owners. Since the regulation on foster children had not been revised up to then,
the MP demanded to evaluate the placement indicators, on which basis the children are
allocated to a foster family.
The main focus of the evaluation was to oppose the current policy and to persuade the
Federal Council to change the regulation on foster children. In particular, the MP wanted
to have an evaluation of the placement criteria in order to revise them. The MP’s aim
was to urge the public servants to read up on the subject of foster children. She was very
engaged in this topic, since she had served as a co-chairwoman and board member of the
interest group Pflegekinder-Aktion Schweiz for several years. Although the organization
did not suggest this specific parliamentary request, her activities in this field were examined
in the context of her engagement for this organization. The non-profit organization is
committed to the interests of foster children in order to encourage their development
opportunities. In doing so, the organization focused on the placement of foster children,
which is why they were engaged in several research projects (Arnold et al., 2008; Gassmann,
2013). On the basis of these studies, the MP had already submitted several parliamentary
requests25 in order to revise the regulation on foster children. According to the MP, the
policy field is very influenced by the Swiss federalism, which is why the municipalities can
implement the policy on the basis of their own interpretation. Since private companies
participate in this market, the MP feared that the well-being of the children would be in
danger without a regulation.
The Federal Council replied that they would not consider an evaluation, since the
regulation on foster children was planned for 2012 and they wanted to wait and see how
the new regulation would prove of value. Nevertheless, the MP was satisfied with the reply
25Question 05.5270 "Veröffentlichung Expertenbericht Pflegekinder", postulate 02.3239 "Pflegekinder-
wesen in der Schweiz" and interpellation 01.3344 "Umsetzung der Pflegekinderverordnung".
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altogether and according to her, some of her suggestions’ were integrated in the revision.26
While the case provides evidence for the first hypothesis, it does not show any relevance
regarding the second hypothesis. The parliamentary request clearly illustrates how the
MP wanted to demand the evaluation in order to find evidence against the current legal
situation of the foster children’s placements. In collaboration with the interest group, she
developed an alternative policy, which the Federal Council should take up for the new
legislation. As for the second hypothesis, the request shows that the MP’s party group
membership does not influence the evaluation strategy. Although the Federal Councillor
is from the same party as the MP, the MP still chose to oppose the policy. The author of
the parliamentary request is the same as in case 5, but the evaluation strategy is exactly
the same despite the responsible Federal Councillor being from a different party in the
first case, and from the same party in the second case.
Case 7: Are New Buildings Energetically Better than Building Restoration? (Postulate
13.3903)
In 2011, the Federal Council declared to resist from nuclear power after the nuclear disaster
of Fukushima in March of the same year. In the course of that debate, several questions
were raised about the efficient use of energy, since one generally assumed that fewer energy
resources would be available in the future. According to the MP, the incentive systems for
replacement buildings were not very well developed in contrast to the subsidized rehabili-
tation programs, since the current tax law financially supported energetic refurbishments
for existing buildings. However, the MP argued that the promotion of replacement build-
ings would make sense from a spatial planning point of view, as they would contribute
to the increase of building density, which is of high value, even when taking into account
the gray energy27. Hence, the MP demanded the Federal Council to present the Federal
Assembly with a report that would provide insight into the extent to which replacement
26Pflegekinderverordnung, PAVO, AS 1977 1931.
27The gray energy indicates the required energy that is needed for the demolition and the new con-
struction.
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buildings were energetically more efficient than the energetic refurbishment of buildings.
According to the MP, the main goal of the evaluation was to show that it would be
more energetically efficient to replace a large number of buildings rather than having them
refurbished, so that the Federal Council would consider measures to promote the replace-
ment of dated buildings. At the time of the request, the MP was professionally working
in the construction industry and was also active at Green Building Switzerland, which is
committed to the replacement and modernization of houses. The association originated
in the building materials sector, which also was interested in building sustainably. On the
topic of construction, he had previously submitted several proposals in this policy field,
including an introduction of a comprehensive sustainability label in the building sector.
According to the MP, this particular postulate aimed to provide a basis for another par-
liamentary request that he had submitted at the same time.28 According to the MP, they
expected more support for the request by submitting it to both chambers by MPs from
left and right parties. Hence, the MP pursued the strategy to oppose the current law.
The evaluation’s goal was to raise awareness about the fact that rebuilding a construc-
tion would often, energetically speaking, make more sense than to renovate the existing
building.
The Federal Council did not share the MP’s view and referred to another report that
was commissioned by the Swiss Federal Office of Energy comparing rebuilding and refur-
bishment (Ott et al., 2002). From the perspective of the Federal Council, the situation
has not changed since 2002, which, according to the Council, would still be valid for the
current situation. The report concluded that the amount of saved energy would depend on
the prerequisites for an energy-saving renovation. Moreover, the Federal Council had ex-
amined the possibilities for a specific financial support program for replacement buildings
within the framework of the first package of measures for the Energy Strategy 2050.29
28Motion 13.3119 "Steuerliche Gleichbehandlung von energiesparenden Investitionen bei bestehenden
Gebäuden und bei Ersatzneubauten".
29The Federal Council launched the Energy Strategy 2050 after the decision to withdraw nuclear power
in the near future. The strategy should ensure that Switzerland would still have enough energy resources
as well as reduce the country’s energy-related environmental impact.
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However, the agencies decided that the financial support for replacement constructions
should be applied within the framework of the canton-specific legislation in order to opti-
mize the use of the subsidies. The MP was disappointed with the government’s response,
particularly since the government also rejected his other motion regarding the tax relief
for replacement buildings.
The case finds some evidence, which supports both hypotheses. On the one hand, the
MP had a clear policy agenda for introducing a new tax system for replacing buildings.
Since his main interest was to realize a new policy, he demanded an evaluation in order to
oppose the current status quo. In doing so, he seemed very confident that the evaluation
would back up his point of view. On the other hand, the MP seemed to give the impression
that the introduction of the new policy was also partly due to the responsible Federal
Councillor, who does not belong to the same party group. However, the MP did not
demand the evaluation in order to attack the Federal Councillor, but rather to persuade
her from his opinion by generating evidence for his point of view. Hence, the evaluation
request is rather a result of different ideological views than the aim of harming the political
opponent.
Case 8: Is the Equality Policy Still Contemporary? (Interpellation 13.3270)
The Federal Act on Gender Equality30 was established in 1995 and aims to promote
the equality of women and men in working life. According to the MP, the policy has
been a success story in certain areas, but in the case of key indicators - wage inequality,
women’s share in top management, part-time work for men - progress is minimal. As a
consequence, the traditional family model still represents the norm in Switzerland, which
is why the economy has lost an enormous potential of female workers. The policy was
still characterized by the spirit of the 1980s and 1990s, according to which equality is
primarily a promotion of women. However, the discussion has recently shifted towards a
"relational equality paradigm", which neither fully concentrates on women nor on men.
30Gleichstellungsgesetz GIG, SR 151.10.
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Thus, the MP demanded an evaluation of the existing policy in order to examine its
effectiveness, especially regarding the inclusion of both sexes. Moreover, he raised the
question of whether the Federal Council would be prepared to elaborate a new gender
equality policy on the basis of the evaluation’s findings.
The main goal of the evaluation was to oppose the current equality policy. According
to the MP, the request was mainly pushed by the associations männer.ch31 and Män-
nerzeitung32. The MP is an active member in both organizations and has submitted the
request in collaboration with them. His claim is that there is a large deficit in the rep-
resentation of men in the area of equality policy, which is strongly influenced by women.
According to the MP, men are often strongly disadvantaged in equality policies. However,
the aim was not to immediately revise the policy, but to make the government aware of the
current misrepresentation of men in the equality policy. Currently, the question of gender
equality is settled at the Federal Office for Gender Equality and the Federal Commission
for Women’s Issues, which are both dominated by women. The MP was confident that
the evaluation would illustrate that there was a lack of representation of men’s interests
within the current policy and that the Federal Council would consider a change.
In its response, the Federal Council highlighted that the current gender equality policy
aims to promote the effective equality of women and men in working life. The Federal
Council claimed that it already considers measures, which include the focus of men ("Make
it work. Männerprojekte für mehr Gleistellung im Erwerbsleben"). Moreover, the Federal
Council had already commissioned an evaluation in 2005 in order to examine the effective-
ness of the current policy (Stutz et al., 2005).33 On the basis of this evaluation, the Federal
Council decided that the current policy was effective and that there was no urgent need
for a revision. Therefore, the Federal Council did not see any need for a new evaluation.
31Männer.ch was established in 2005 as the umbrella organization of progressive Swiss men’s and fathers’
organizations to promote men’s representation in the equality discourse.
32The Männerzeitung was founded in 2005 and is the platform of organized men’s and fathers’ move-
ments in Switzerland.
33The evaluation was based on a parliamentary request by the National Councilor Vreni Hubmann
(Motion 02.3142 "Keine Rachekündigungen gegen Frauen, die sich wehren"). The MP demanded that
dismissals based on revenge in private employment contracts should be void instead of contestable and
that the duration of protection against termination should be prolonged appropriately.
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Although the MP did not agree with the response, he was satisfied with the interpellation,
which raised awareness on the male perspective in the gender equality policy within the
government.
The case is able to support the first hypothesis, while the second one has to be rejected
on the basis of these findings. Similarly to the previous case, the MP had a clear idea of
a new policy that he establishes in collaboration with an interest group. In doing so, the
evaluation had the goal to provide evidence that supported his policy and at the same time
showed the misfit of the current policy. Regarding the second hypothesis, the MP also
sought to oppose the policy although he belongs to the same party group as the responsible
Federal Councillor. Instead of supporting the policy, the MP aimed to promote himself
and his policy at the expense of the Federal Council.
Case 9: Expiration of the Doctor Admission Moratorium. Evaluation of the Consequences
(Postulate 12.3218)
In 2001, the Federal Council introduced a moratorium for the admission of new doctors,
as they assumed a relation between the number of doctor’s offices and the increasing
health care costs. In doing so, the federal government was authorized to admit providers
of compulsory health insurance, depending on a proven need for a period of up to three
years.34 The moratorium was extended three times in total, until the Social Security
and Health Committee of the Council of States decided to end the temporary admission
stop by the end of 2011. Thereafter, the cantons received hundreds of new applicants for
the medical occupation. According to the MP, the unregulated admission of new doctors
would challenge the demographic distribution of health care in Switzerland. As cities and
agglomerations are very attractive working areas, the coverage of medical care would lead
to an over-supply in those very areas and to an under-supply in the rural areas. Thus, the
MP demanded an evaluation, which would examine the consequences of the expiration of
the doctor admission moratorium on the medical coverage in the cantons. He stressed to
34Art 55a, Krankenversicherungsgesetz KVG, SR 832.10.
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evaluate the overall impact on the location of new doctors’ offices, the specialist areas,
health costs and a potential medical over- or under-supply.
According to the MP, his main goal was the re-introduction of the moratorium for the
admission of new doctors by the Federal Council, since he preferred a policy change. He
had an academic background and had conducted research in the field of social security for
many years. Moreover, he even published two books on the problem of the distribution of
doctor’s practices in Switzerland (Gilliand et al., 1991; Rossini and Legrand-Germanier,
2010). From his point of view, the authorities knew about the problem that higher admis-
sions would lead to higher expenses, but there was hardly any data on this topic. More-
over, the consequence of the moratorium’s end was unknown, as the medical landscape
had strongly developed in the last ten years. At the same time, the popular initiative "Ja
zur Hausarztmedizin" 35 was launched, which dealt with the same issue. The MP feared
that the debate on this issue would be dominated by emotions, as the left-right conflict
is especially distinct in this policy field. Therefore, the evaluation should have provided
an information basis for the Federal Council in order to make a decision regarding the
moratorium. However, the MP clearly stated that he already anticipated what results the
evaluation would show and that the report would simply confirm his assumptions.
The Federal Council shared the MP’s view and suggested the Federal Assembly to
accept the parliamentary request. The response argued that the government was aware
of the unknown consequences of the moratorium’s end and that it has made a detailed
statement on this issue and proposed measures to curb it while responding to another
parliamentary request36. However, the Federal Council admitted that an evaluation of the
consequences could provide important information on the development of the situation,
since it would integrate all political actors. Although the National Council accepted the
35The popular initiative "Ja zur Hausarztmedizin" was submitted in 2010, but the initiative committee
withdrew the proposal after the Federal Assembly passed a direct counterproposal which was accepted by
the Swiss people with 88%. Since then, the constitution has demanded that the Confederation and the
cantons ensure a high quality of medical care that is accessible to all, and to promote family medicine as
an essential component.
36Interpellation 11.3892 "Zulassungsstopp für die Eröffnung von Arztpraxen. Auswirkungen auf die
Kantone".
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parliamentary request, the postulate was depreciated in 2015. The Federal Council argued
that in the meantime, it has adopted its dispatch regarding the amending of the Federal
Law on Health Insurance, which was accepted by the Federal Assembly Parliament.37
Thus, an evaluation of the consequences of the abolition would therefore no longer be
relevant. Albeit the MP was satisfied that the government accepted his proposal, he was
partly disappointed, since he would have preferred the realization of the evaluation.
The case offers evidence for the first hypothesis, but does not suggest an effect of
the party group membership. After the Federal Council changed its policy regarding the
doctor admission process, the MP sought an evaluation in order to show how the policy
change had lead to mismanagement. Hence, the evaluation’s goal was clearly to oppose
the policy, in particular since the MP was not open towards the results of the evaluation.
However, the MP used to be a member in the Control Committee, with the exemption of
201238 when he submitted this very parliamentary request. Although he was still strongly
aware of parliamentary oversight, he admitted that in that year, his focus was rather
on legislative issues. Similarly to previous cases, the party group membership does not
explain the evaluation strategy. Albeit the MP is from the same party as the responsible
Federal Councillor, he was not willing to support a policy that he believes is ineffective.
Case 10: Credit for the Occupational Integration in the Federal Administration (Question
10.1124)
The Federal Administration has a credit for occupational integration, which is intended
to support the reintegration of sick and injured employees and promote the training,
employment and retention of employment of people with disabilities. In 2009, the Federal
Council changed the criteria for the allocation of resources. The new system created a
financial incentive for the administrative units to prevent disability as far as possible. In
this way, work trials and the gradual reintegration could be funded on the basis of a case
37BBl 2012 9439.
38In 2012, the MP served as president for a legislative committee, which requires the resignation from
other committees according to the rules of his party.
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management of the personnel and social counseling services of the Federal Administration.
However, the MP was afraid that the changes might result in fewer people with disabilities
benefiting from the credit. Thus, the MP wanted to know from the Federal Council how
they would assess the consequences of the change.
The MP’s strategy was mainly to obtain information on the policy change. Due to
his professional academic background as well as his membership in the Social Security
and Health Committee, the MP had been dealing with the same issues for several years,
particularly within the revision of the disability insurance. Hence, he had been contacted
by an interest group to call his attention on the changes that had been implemented since
2009 regarding the credit for occupational integration. Since the MP had not been aware of
the modification of the credit of the professional integration, he decided to seek information
on this issue by submitting a parliamentary request to the Federal Council. According
to the MP, he was indifferent towards the changes, but he nevertheless considered them
sufficiently important for investigation. The aim of the evaluation was to sensitize the
situation to the Federal Council. The evaluation was to have a special focus on the
effectiveness of the policy and should have showed that the concerned employees still
benefited from the reintegration program.
In their response, the Federal Council stressed that they were taking the subject seri-
ously. The response argued that the Federal Council had no information about the credit
disadvantaging certain people. Moreover, the Council claimed that they would evaluate
the changes after three years, which had not yet been done at that point, although there
were other reports, which analyzed the measures of the Federal Administration in order
to integrate people with disabilities (Eidgenössische Finanzkontrolle, 2011; Egger et al.,
2015). However, the Federal Council’s response was secondary for the MP, as he had
not primarily hoped for a conducted evaluation. His most important goal had been to
make the government aware of the new situation and that they would consider taking
appropriate measures - if necessary.
The case provides evidence for the first hypothesis, but not for the second one. The MP
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used to be a member in the Control Committee, for which he served during several years.
Thus, the parliamentary request was strongly motivated by the idea to obtain information
on the implementation of the policy and to oversee the practice of the Federal Council.
In contrast, the membership was not very important for the evaluation strategy. Despite
the fact that he belongs to a different parliamentary group than the responsible Federal
Councillor, the MP demanded an evaluation in order to obtain information. However, the
policy is rather technical and it is questionable whether he could promote himself to his
voters with such a policy.
Case 11: Federal Prevention Programs Tobacco, Alcohol, and Diet & Exercise (Interpella-
tion 12.3498)
The parliamentary request was submitted in the course of the Federal Law on Prevention
and Health Promotion, of which the final vote took place in September of 2012. The
policy had adopted federal regulations for the control of widespread or malignant diseases.
The aim was to improve the management, coordination and efficiency of prevention, health
promotion and early detection measures. The policy was developed with the Federal Office
of Public Health and had intended a strategic role for Health Promotion Switzerland39
(Bundesrat, 2009). The MP is strongly linked to the latter, as he served as the president
of the foundation until March 2012. Since he knew that the approval of the Prevention Law
- which he supported - would be precarious, he wanted to have a discussion about previous
evaluations, of which the results showed a positive effect of the programs (Balthasar et al.,
2011; Von Stokar et al., 2011).
The MP’s intention for discussing the evaluation results of the federal prevention pro-
grams was to support the Prevention Law. He estimated that the response to the interpel-
lation would come out in the end of August, shortly after the discussion on the Prevention
Law. According to the MP, he wanted to encourage a discussion, and it was important to
him that he could respond to the answer of the interpellation. In doing so, he already knew
39Health Promotion Switzerland is a private foundation, which is supported by cantons and insurers.
The foundation initiates, coordinates and evaluates measures to promote health and to prevent disease.
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about the positive results of the evaluations, which showed that the prevention programs
were effective. Hence, he was particularly interested in hearing the Federal Council state
how effective the prevention programs had been operating.
The Federal Council did not disappoint the MP. The government, which also strongly
supported the Prevention Law, pointed out the positive results of the evaluations and the
assets of prevention programs in an unusually long reply. Thus, the MP was very satisfied
with the answer, especially as the Council of States had had a small debate on the merits
of the prevention programs. However, the Prevention Law was buried by the Council of
States after a conciliation committee40 had elaborated an alternate proposal. Overall, the
MP was disappointed by the outcome of the vote.
This case is the only parliamentary request that does not provide evidence for the
first hypothesis. That being said, the demanded evaluation is the only one that has the
motivation to support the policy. The MP is a member of the Control Committee and
also quite active in parliamentary oversight. However, he was also deeply engaged in the
legislative area of health, to which he is strongly linked by his occupational and political
background. In contrast, the MP supported the policy although he belongs to a different
party group than the responsible Federal Councillor. His target was not to highlight the
good work of the government, but rather to pursue his legislative targets - the acceptance
of the prevention law.
Case 12: Federal ICT-Projects. Quo Vaditis? (Postulate 13.4062)
Several ICT-projects of the Federal Administration had to be cancelled in the last couple
of years due to mismanagement. The ICT-project Insieme41 by itself cost Switzerland
over 100 million Swiss Francs. The abandonment of the project attracted high attention
in society and media. According to the MP, the project management of the Federal
40If the National Council and Council of States still have differences following three detailed discus-
sions in each Council, a conciliation committee is appointed. This committee is responsible for seeking a
compromise solution (Art 91, ParlA, 171.10 SR).
41Insieme was a ICT-project, initiated by the Federal Tax Administration in 2001 to replace the separate
IT systems of stamp and value added tax. The Federal Council decided to cancel the project in 2012
(Finanz- und Geschäftsprüfungskommission der eidgenössischen Räte, 2014).
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Government needed to be critically questioned and compulsorily improved, so that new
projects could be completed. Hence, the MP wanted to give the Federal Council the
opportunity to investigate their ICT-project management and wanted them to draw lessons
from the previous projects’ failures. The parliamentary request demanded the Federal
Council to present a report on the ICT-projects of the Federal Administration. In addition,
the same postulate was also submitted by his party in the National Council at the same
time.42
The MP wanted to evaluate the project management of the Federal Administration in
order to receive information about the process. His aim was not to question the whole
project management process, but it was rather a matter of clearly documenting and man-
ifesting that one could not carry out ICT-projects with that kind of management and
(non-)control. In the case of Insieme, a large number of external ICT-specialists was em-
ployed, who disavowed the internal ICT staff. The oversight of these people, however, is
not within the competence of the parliament. The parliament granted them the money
and assumed that the processes would be carried out properly. After the Control Commit-
tee and the Finance Committee of both councils decided to investigate Insieme, the MP
had the impression that the project management of such ICT-projects generally needed to
be evaluated. In doing so, he did not question the specific projects, but rather wanted to
evaluate their processes and the efficiency of the assigned financial resources. He stressed
that he did not have an opinion about how the processes should be reorganized, but he felt
the need that the parliament and also the government should obtain more information on
how the projects are conducted. However, he assumed that some know-how was missing
in the government, as many tasks were delegated to private organizations. This also made
the oversight more difficult for the parliament.
The Federal Council supported the MP’s postulate and presented a report in 2014
(Bundesrat, 2014). In order to ensure an independent evaluation, the Federal Council
commissioned the Institute for Business Informatics of the University of St. Gallen to
42Postulate 13.4141 "IT-Projekte des Bundes. Quo vaditis?" by the FDP.The Liberal party group.
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analyze ICT-projects, to draw lessons from them and to propose measures. The study
found that insufficient control or management had led to difficulties in over two-thirds
of the investigated objects. Moreover, the report argued that major difficulties are not
attributable to the ICT-aspects of the projects, but rather to the framework conditions
in the agencies. The MP registered the report and was satisfied with the processing of
the Federal Council. The report was the basis for further reports from the oversight
committees. According to the MP, the Federal Council had made the right conclusions.
The case is able to find evidence for the first hypothesis, while the second hypothesis
cannot be supported based on the findings. The MP demanded the evaluation in order
to obtain information on the process management of the Federal Administration. In
doing so, he was open towards the results and also delegated the implementation of the
recommendations of the evaluation to the government. The MP wanted to have the
evaluation, since he had the impression that the parliament should take actions due to
the previous mismanagement. In contrast, the MP did not demand an evaluation to point
out the good work of the government, albeit he belongs to the same party group as the
responsible Federal Councillor. Instead, he decided to provide the government with an
opportunity to obtain information about previous projects, so that they can improve future
actions.
Additional Observations
The case studies provide pronounced evidence for the impact of committee memberships
on the evaluation strategy, while the party group membership does not play any role
at all.43 Furthermore, the comparison of the cases reveals three additional observations.
First, the cases suggest that there is not a clear relationship between the background of
a policy and the evaluation strategy. Albeit there is a slight tendency that policy failures
lead to an oppositional evaluation, and that policy changes lead to an evaluation in order
to provide information, the amount of cases is too small in order to draw conclusions.
43For a full comparative analysis of the results, see section 5 in Bundi (2017, 7-8).
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Moreover, the theoretical explanation for such a relationship has not yet been developed,
even though it seems plausible that MPs seek to raise awareness about failed policies
and obtain information about policy changes. Second, the trigger of the parliamentary
request does not influence the evaluation strategy. The cases do not reveal any pattern
regarding whether interest groups prefer oppositional, supportive, or informative evalua-
tions. However, Varone et al. (2017) suggest that interest groups are more likely to seek
evaluations in some policy fields than in others. In contrast, it seems doubtful to which
extent personal interest can make a contribution to explain the evaluation strategy of a
parliamentary request. Third, the characteristics of the parliamentary request (e.g. the
type of instrument, the party of the author or the number of co-sponsors) do not seem
to be relevant for the evaluation strategy. Again, the limited external validity due to the
research design does not allow any conclusion, but the interviews did not suggest any
theoretical connection whatsoever.
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Table 3.5: Summary of Case Studies 1-6
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Table 3.6: Summary of Case Studies 7-12
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4.1 Introduction
Accountability and its importance for contemporary democracies has been widely dis-
cussed in literature, especially in the relationship between parliaments and governments
(Strøm et al., 2006; Olsen, 2015). In doing so, the question of how parliaments execute
their oversight function has attracted growing interest lately (Karlas, 2012; Winzen, 2012;
Stapenhurst and Pelizzo, 2012; Blom-Hansen, 2013). However, these studies often ignore
that parliamentary oversight might vary across policy fields, since policy fields differ in
their institutional settings, involved actors and available resources. Indeed, several studies
for the European Union show that accountability varies across agencies and policy areas
(Egeberg and Trondal, 2011; Koop, 2011; Hanretty and Koop, 2012; Font and Durán,
2016). Given the different natures of policy fields, this study considers the question of
why members of parliament (MPs) aim to oversee some policy fields more frequently than
others.
This paper argues that policy fields are shaped by policy attributes, which influence
the MPs’ need for accountability differently. In general, the demand for accountability
has increased in the last couple of decades, since the implementation process of many
policy fields has changed fundamentally (Benz et al., 2007). While policies used to be
implemented top-down by agencies, they are nowadays more often realized through pri-
vate organizations within policy networks. The article develops the argument that the
implementation process within policy networks leads to different needs of parliamentary
oversight. In policy fields where cooperative forms of governance are more present, the
need for accountability is higher, since the MPs have more difficulties to oversee such
processes and have stronger incentives to control those areas (Papadopoulos, 2007). The
study examines the hypotheses that the extent of delegation and legitimation in a policy
field influences the MPs’ likelihood to execute parliamentary oversight.
These arguments are analyzed by using the example of parliamentary requests de-
manding a policy evaluation in Switzerland. Several studies have recently shown that
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parliamentary requests or questions are used by the parliament in order to oversee the
government and its agencies (Russo and Wiberg, 2010; Proksch and Slapin, 2011; Martin
and Rozenberg, 2014). Parliamentary requests have a particularly important role for par-
liamentary oversight in Switzerland, since Swiss MPs are not fully professionalized and
the oversight capacities are rather weak by comparison. Moreover, evaluations are par-
ticularly interesting for MPs to demand within parliamentary requests, as they assess the
effectiveness or efficiency of a policy in a systematic and transparent way (Widmer and
DeRocchi, 2012, 14). According to Bundi (2016), evaluations do not only provide informa-
tion for evidence-based policy making, but also help MPs to fulfill their oversight function
towards the government. During evaluations, agencies have to provide information on the
policy implementation process to the parliament. Hence, evaluations are an effective tool
for MPs in order to hold the government accountable (Pollitt, 2006).
Empirically, the article analyzes a survey that was conducted amongst the Swiss MPs
at the national and subnational level in 2014. In order to obtain information about
their motivation for demanding policy evaluations, the MPs were asked about the role of
evaluations within their parliament. Moreover, an expert survey amongst Swiss political
scientists provides additional information about policy fields’ attributes. Investigating
legislative oversight by parliamentary requests, Switzerland is a particularly interesting
case. On the one hand, the most common parliamentary requests can be found in the
Swiss parliaments (Wiberg, 1995, 187-188). On the other hand, focusing on evaluation
demand, the country does not only have a relatively high evaluation culture, but it also
has the most developed institutionalization of evaluation within the parliament (Jacob
et al., 2015, 19).
This article demonstrates that a MPs’ demand for accountability indeed varies across
policy fields. In doing so, MPs interpret their oversight role differently depending on the
policy field. In those policy fields where more public activities are delegated to private
organizations or the need for legitimation is particularly high, MPs are more likely to de-
mand an evaluation, since the need for accountability is higher. Both effects increase with
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the policy fields’ closeness to science. The findings support the argument that policy fields’
attributes have an important impact on how MPs fulfill their parliamentary oversight in
a specific policy field.
The next sections are structured as follows: First, section 4.2 discusses how the change
in policy implementation has affected accountability. Section 4.3 illustrates the parlia-
mentary oversight institutions in Switzerland. Section 4.4 develops the argument and hy-
potheses. Section 4.5 introduces data and methods, together with the operationalization.
Then section 4.6 presents the results of the analysis. Section 4.7 discusses implications
for other countries and oversight institutions. 4.8 concludes the results and discusses the
relevance of the findings for further research.
4.2 Policy Implementation and Accountability
The organization of policy implementation has gone through a fundamental change in
the last fifty years (Benz et al., 2007). During the 1960s, policy makers were convinced
that the administration could plan the policy implementation from top down. However,
Pressman and Wildavsky (1984) showed that this way of implementation did not work,
since the administration units did not necessarily implement a policy within the meaning
of the policy maker. In doing so, the administration units are influenced by a complex
set-up of individual and collective actors, which have varying interests. The literature
often argues that modern societies have slightly shifted from government to governance
(Mayntz, 2006; Sager et al., 2014).1 Governance can be referred to as a circumstance, in
which collective decisions are made in non-hierarchical independence between public and
private actors. Within the so-called cooperative governance, the state does not pursue
a sovereign position, but rather tries to steer policy networks indirectly and imperfectly
when it seems appropriate (Rhodes, 1997, 53).
However, the policy implementation by networks, involving public actors and non-
1The literature usually distinguishes between two different definitions of governance. Governance can
either be understood as the opposing model to government or as all possible forms of governing (Bevir,
2013). This article refers to the first understanding.
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public actors, entails problems of accountability. According to Bovens (2007, 470), ac-
countability is defined as "a relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the
actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose
questions and pose judgment, and the actor may face consequences". In doing so, cooper-
ative governance is not primarily designed for democratization of policy making, but for
a solution to functional problems. Papadopoulos (2007, 473-483) identifies four problems
of accountability caused by cooperative governance: First, policy networks have a weak
visibility. Decisions within policy networks tend to be informal and the responsibility is
shared amongst a large number of actors (Bovens, 1998). Since policy networks are often
uncoupled from the public authorities, the capacity for the administration units to oversee
the networks’ activities is complicated. Second, policy networks are typically composed of
various actors, such as bureaucrats, policy experts, and interest representatives. Indeed,
public servants are accountable to the government, but this administrative accountability
is less pronounced than in other relationships (Christiansen, 1997). Furthermore, policy
experts and interest representatives are even less accountable. Third, policy networks
consist of complex structures on multiple levels where decisions are made across levels
(Hooghe and Marks, 2003). Negotiations across levels are often more informal and im-
pede accountability, as these are usually not publicly accessible. Last, relations between
actors in policy networks also cause problems with accountability. A peer accountability
rises within a policy network when participants of policy networks evaluate their counter-
parts (Grant and Keohane, 2005). Particularly when the composition of policy networks
does not change over time, there is a certain probability that participants may be more
accountable to their negotiation partners than towards the public.
Public administration literature on third-party governance has mainly debated about
to what extent policy networks can be made accountable (Posner, 2002; Koliba et al.,
2011). However, the lack of accountability in cooperative governance not only affects the
public administration, but also the parliament. In doing so, policy implementation within
policy networks tightens the problem of parliamentary oversight due to agency problems.
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Naturally in all democracies, agency problems occur between the parliament and the ad-
ministration. According to Strøm (2000, 266), the policy process can described as a chain
of delegation, in "which those authorized to make political decisions conditionally desig-
nate others to make such decisions in their name and place". In a legislative-executive
relationship, MPs pass bills and delegate their implementation to the administration. The
delegation process generates a principal-agent relationship between the parliament and
the administration (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991). The parliament (principal) commis-
sions the agency (agent) to implement the policy in exchange for a reward (financial and
personal resources). Since an agency may have other interests than the parliament (bu-
reaucratic drift) and it may also have an information advantage (information asymmetry),
the MPs cannot be sure that the administration implements the public policies in their
sense. Hence, the problems of bureaucratic drift and information asymmetry give the MPs
incentives to oversee the government (Lupia, 2003, 44).
The way in which policies are implemented is crucial for MPs. If they cannot be
sure whether the legislation is implemented in their favor, then they might feel that their
personal goals are jeopardized. Several studies have argued that MPs are mainly driven by
reelection and good public policy (Mayhew, 1974). While reelection depends on the public
perception of the MP’s performance within the parliament, good public policy relies on
the assumption that the policy is implemented according to the MP’s interpretation. On
the one hand, voters will not reelect MPs if they have the impression that the politicians
did not keep their promises. On the other hand, a public policy will - from a MPs’ point
of view - not be good if it is not implemented according to the parliament. Since the
policy implementation is so important for MPs to achieve their goals, the parliamentary
oversight takes an eminent role for their mandate.
4.3 Parliamentary Oversight in Switzerland
Parliamentary oversight can have different forms of institutional design. Kiewiet and Mc-
Cubbins (1991, 27) identify four key methods how parliaments may oversee the government
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with its agencies: Contract design, screening and selection, monitoring and reports, and
institutional checks. While the first two categories apply before the delegation process (ex
ante mechanism), the latter two appear thereafter (ex post mechanism).
In Switzerland, monitoring and reporting as well as institutional checks dominate the
parliamentary oversight. In doing so, they are institutionally organized through oversight
committees. While the control committees scrutinize the conduct of business by the gov-
ernment and the agencies, the finance committees exercise the supervisory control over the
finances of the executive. In doing so, they carry out investigations as well as inspections
and review the annual and management reports, which they sum up in written reports
with recommendations for the attention of the government. However, the strength of those
reports is restricted since the parliaments have limited institutional control capacities. Ac-
cording to (Schnapp and Harfst, 2005), the Swiss federal parliament especially lacks in
structures and legal basis for controlling the government, which is essential in order to
investigate the government. Unsurprisingly, the committees’ reports are often affectless,
as the governments often do not respond to their recommendations (Mastronardi, 1990,
139-141).
Since the institutions of parliamentary oversight are limited in Switzerland, MPs have
to resort to other means. Recent studies have pointed out the importance of parliamentary
requests and in particular of parliamentary oversight (Russo and Wiberg, 2010; Proksch
and Slapin, 2011; Jensen et al., 2013; Martin and Rozenberg, 2014). This is particularly
eminent in Switzerland, where a rich variety of parliamentary instruments are at the
parliaments’ disposal and the use of parliamentary requests has more than doubled in the
last twenty years (Vatter, 2016, 298). In general, parliamentary requests enable MPs to
propose new policies or to obtain information on specific issues. In doing so, parliamentary
requests can be submitted by individual MPs, a parliamentary group or a committee.
Usually they are signed by several MPs, but most of the time only one MP initiated the
request (Bundi, 2017). As a consequence, the requests require very little preparation time,
which is why they barely have any costs for MPs (Bailer, 2011). This is particularly impor-
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Note: The figure illustrates the number of parliamentary requests as well as monitoring and reporting
instruments at the federal level between 2003 and November 29th, 2015. Instruments are listed according
to their frequency. Reports include evaluations by the Parliamentary Control of the Administration.
Supervisions are investigations that are based on leads by a third party. Visits refer to official inspections
of agencies by the oversight committees. Source: Parlamentsdienste der eidgenössischen Räte (2015);
Geschäftsprüfungskommissionen der eidgenössischen Räte (2015).
tant for Swiss MPs, since they rarely ever have personal assistants and the party offices are
relatively small. Figure 4.1 shows that parliamentary requests appear more frequently than
monitoring and reporting instruments, which are produced by the oversight committees.
In order to oversee the government, MPs may not only ask questions, but also demand
policy evaluations. The request can directly ask for an evaluation or it can be designed
in such a way that the executive decides to carry out an evaluation in order to answer
the parliamentary proposal. In any case, the government shall pass the initiative to the
responsible department or agency, which carries out the evaluation. Evaluations have
the advantage that the government has to conduct a profound investigation in order to
satisfy the parliamentary request, whilst a question can often be answered with a short
response. During an evaluation, agencies have to make their actions transparent and
provide information for stakeholders and particularly for parliaments. As a consequence,
MPs do not only obtain information on how a policy was implemented, but also whether
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the policy was effective or efficient. By using a parliamentary request, parliaments can
react to short-dated events and do not have to monitor all the activities of the agencies,
which is what they generally prefer (McCubbins and Schwartz, 1984).
Hence, policy evaluations are frequently used to establish accountability in policy net-
works. While hearings and inspections are difficult and costly to establish with non-public
actors, evaluations are an efficient instrument to oversee the policy implementation within
policy networks. In doing so, the delegation of an evaluation to the agencies has appealing
characteristics for MPs. Evaluation reports that are commissioned by the government are
not only an opportunity for MPs to outsource the cost of producing policy expertise, but
also to obtain authoritative and objective information. During the evaluation report, the
contracted evaluators get access to all kind of information that helps them to understand
the policy implementation and overcome the weak visibility of policy networks, as they
have easier access to non-governmental policy experts and interest representatives.
However, the policy process differs across the policy fields, which is why the MPs
have different incentives to fulfill their oversight function. Depending on the policy fields’
attributes, they will submit more parliamentary requests in order to demand an evaluation
in some policy fields than in others. Hence, the next section provides an explanation why
some policy fields have a higher need for accountability than others.
4.4 Varieties of Accountability Across Policy Fields
Policy fields - also referred to in literature as policy areas, sectors, or domains - cover a
certain group of policies, which have a similar social scope. They may be compared to
what some authors refer to as policy subsystems (Sabatier, 1998). A policy subsystem
consists of public and private actors who are interested in a policy problem or issue, and
who regularly seek to influence a public policy in a domain. In doing so, they differ not
only in their context (actors, size, resources), but also in their nature. As a consequence,
policy fields are political arenas in which the political actors find different conditions for
behaving.
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Variation across policy fields is nothing new to public policy literature. For instance,
Lowi (1972) distinguishes four types of policies - distributive, redistributive, constituent,
and regulative policy - which shape the political arena by influencing the relationships
between the political actors. Moreover, Baumgartner and Jones (2010) characterize the
policy field in the Punctuated Equilibrium Theory (PET) as the arena where change hap-
pens. In doing so, policy fields are characterized by long terms of stability and are only
punctuated by short, but severe terms of crisis in which large-scale changes occur, which
are caused by destabilizing events or by the accumulation of unaddressed grievances. Since
those events do not affect all policy fields at the same time, we can observe policy change
in some areas, but not in others. This is partly also true for parliamentary oversight. In
doing so, policy fields have certain conditions for the need of accountability, which is the
fundamental incentive for MPs to control the agency.
In the following, this section argues that two different characteristics of policy fields
influence the need for accountability: The extent of delegation and the need for legitima-
tion. While the extent of delegated public services is purely descriptive and affects the
accessibility of parliamentary oversight, the need for legitimation is rather based on values
and determines the MPs’ motivation to oversee the policy field. First, the delegation of
the execution of public activities to civil organizations is an important attribute of co-
operative governance (Widmer, 2008a). In doing so, the administration delegates parts
or a full public service to private organizations, which are responsible for their provision.
This process has a lot of advantages, since private organizations are often able to provide
a public service with fewer resources or possess know-how to provide a better service.
However, the delegation of public services also entails perils. The implementation process
of a public policy that is delegated often lacks in accountability, since the implementa-
tion process is uncoupled by the administration and executed by a private organization,
which does not necessarily have the need to be accountable to the public. Moreover, such
an implementation is more difficult to oversee for the parliament, which is why the MPs
have stronger incentives to fulfill their oversight function. Several studies have observed a
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higher evaluation activity in those policy fields that delegate more public activities to such
actors (Verhoest et al., 2007; Widmer, 2008a). I argue, that in those policy areas where
the administration delegates a noticeable amount of public activities to non-public actors,
the MPs are more likely to demand an evaluation in order to overcome the accountability
problem of the policy implementation process:
H1: The more public services are delegated to non-public organizations in a policy field,
the more likely a MP will demand an evaluation with parliamentary requests in this policy
field.
Second, shifts from government to cooperative governance have consequences for the le-
gitimacy of the state activities (Van Kersbergen and van Waarden, 2004). According to
Scharpf (1999, 7-13), legitimacy can either be the procedures that allow the people to
influence political decisions (input legitimacy) or the capacity of the political system to
produce effective outcomes (output legitimacy). It has been argued in literature, that
policy networks are supposed to increase input legitimacy, since it includes the citizens in
the processes of public policies (Benz, 1994). However, those policy networks may cause
output legitimacy deficits, especially when democratic accountability is missing. From the
perspective of a parliament - a key institution of input legitimacy - cooperative governance
structure must not necessarily enjoy high output legitimacy. In general, a public policy
is accepted and supported by the population when a policy can solve a problem of the
society. Actors within policy networks are not always accountable to the public, but of-
ten represent other interests. The less accountable the policy implementation in a policy
field is, the more the parliament will have the need to have those activities legitimated.
Widmer (2009, 354-355) argues that evaluations can play an important role for the output
legitimacy since they indicate which policies are effective and thus can contribute to the
solution of a problem. Evaluations can legitimate a public policy ex post proving the right-
ness of a decision (Majone, 1996; Weiss, 1998). Hence, I argue that in those policy fields
where the need to legitimate policy outputs is high, MPs will demand more evaluations in
order to inform themselves about the performance of policy networks and to ensure that
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policies are implemented in their meaning:
H2: The higher the need to legitimate policy outputs in a policy field, the more likely a MP
will demand an evaluation with parliamentary requests in this policy field.
The next section introduces the data and the methods that the study uses in order to
demonstrate how policy attributes influence the parliamentary oversight by Swiss MPs.
4.5 Data and Methods
In order to analyze the variation of evaluation demand across policy fields, the article uses
data of an online survey amongst Swiss MPs at the national and subnational level, which
was conducted during May and June 2014 (Eberli et al., 2014). The MPs were asked
about their relationship to evaluation.2 In doing so, the survey provided the MPs with a
list of policy fields that they could select from. In order to reduce the complexity for the
MPs, ten policy fields were identified on the basis of the Swiss corpus juris. In addition,
the policy fields were supplemented with specific key words that illustrated the different
areas within a policy field.3 In total, 1570 MPs participated in the survey, which comes
up to a response rate of 55.3% (N=2841).
Next to the attributes delegation and legitimation, the study also considered the policy
field’s attributes salience, closeness to science, and conflictivity, which are based on differ-
ent studies about research on evaluation (Weiss, 1999; Haarich and del Castillo, 2004; Frey,
2010; Pattyn, 2014a). The data on the policy fields’ attributes was gathered by an expert
survey with Swiss political scientists in order to obtain information on the attributes of a
policy field.4 Hooghe et al. (2010, 692) suggests that expert surveys are appropriate if re-
liable information can rather be found with experts than in reliable documentary sources.
2Since MPs have a rather broad understanding of an evaluation, the survey gave a definition in the
introduction: "In this survey, evaluations are interpreted as studies, reports or other documents, which
assess a state’s measure in a systematic and transparent way with respect to their effectiveness, efficiency
or fitness for purpose."
3A full list of the policy fields with the key words can be found in the Appendix (Table 4.2).
4The invited political scientists study Swiss politics and have also completed their PhD. The survey
was conducted during April 2015 and generated a response rate of 68.9% (N=31).
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of Attributes Across Policy Fields
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Since no data is available for the policy fields’ attributes in Switzerland, the experts were
asked to rate the attributes of the different policy fields. In doing so, the survey provided
the same list of policy fields with key words that were included in the survey amongst the
Swiss MPs. Moreover, the survey defined the policy fields’ attributes and asked the ex-
perts to rank the attribute on a scale between 0 and 10.5 In order to compare the expert’s
ratings with each other, the ratings have been standardized. In doing so, the values have
been rescaled to a standard deviation of one and a mean of zero. Figure 4.2 illustrates
the variation across the policy fields. Not only do the different attributes vary within a
policy field, but they also differ across the policy fields. Moreover, the figure shows that
the answers of the experts range within a certain spectrum, with some exceptions.
As the study focuses on the differences between the policy fields, the database has
been stacked (Van der Eijk et al., 2006). A stacked data set is a matrix that derives from
a normal one, the units of analysis do not represent a single MP, but MP×policy field
combinations. In this data matrix, each MP is represented by as many cases as there are
policy fields. For every policy field, an entry is generated that indicates whether a MP has
5The definitions of the policy fields’ attributes can be found in the Appendix (Table 4.3).
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submitted a parliamentary request in a certain policy field. This allows us to distinguish
between policy fields instead of MPs.
The analysis aims to answer the question of whether a parliament has demanded an
evaluation in a policy field. In doing so, MPs were asked if they had submitted a par-
liamentary request in the last four years in order to investigate a public policy regarding
its effectiveness or efficiency, and if so, in which policy field. The dependent variable
"parliamentary request in policy field" is coded with 0 (no request) and 1 (request). The
independent variables delegation, legitimation, salience, conflictivity, and closeness of sci-
ence are rated on a standardized scale between -2 (low) and 2 (high). In order to control
for the institution dimension of a policy field, a variable is included that indicates the
public expenditure of a policy field. Since the attributes of policy fields partly correlate,
the variables are separated in the models and are combined in interaction terms in order
to avoid multicollinearity (Brambor et al., 2006).6
Moreover, several other control variables on the individual and parliament level are
tested. On the MP level, age, sex, level of education, party membership, member of
an opposition party7, parliament experience, membership in the parliament board, mem-
bership in an oversight committee, as well as the attitude towards evaluation. On the
parliament level, the models include the size of the parliament, if the canton/federation
knows a general evaluation clause8 in the constitution, and the institutional position of
the parliament9 towards the government.10
Since the data is structured in three different levels (MP, policy field, and parliament),
I use a multi-level model in order conduct the analysis (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). In
6The covariance matrix of the policy fields’ attributes is illustrated in the Appendix (Table 4.4).
7The canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden is characterized by a high percentage of nonpartisan MPs and
government members, which however share common values (Vatter, 2002, 183). Since the members of
opposition parties could not have really been determined, Appenzell Innerrhoden was excluded from the
analysis.
8An evaluation clause is a passage in the bill that usually urges the government to evaluate a policy
after a certain time. General evaluation clauses in the cantonal/federal constitution do not refer to a
specific policy, but demand the government to frequently evaluate its policies (Bussmann, 2005, 97-99).
9Kaiss (2010) has built an index in order to identify the institutional position of parliament towards
the government. The index is based on the three main functions of the parliament: election, legislation,
and oversight. From the 17 indicators, I only included those that are relevant for parliamentary oversight.
10The operationalization is summarized in the Appendix (Table 4.5).
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doing so, a random intercept model tests variables on all three levels. In addition, the
outcome of the endogenous variable is binary, which is why I will use a logistic regression
model. The following three level model is used to estimate the likelihood to demand an
evaluation with a parliamentary request:
Yijk = γ000 + v0k + u0jk + eijk (1)
where Y is the likelihood to demand an evaluation at the levels i (MP), j (parliament)
and k (policy field), while γ000 stands for the random intercepts. In addition, v0k as well
as u0jk refer to the overall regression slopes, and eijk the random residual error terms at
the three levels.
4.6 Results
During the survey, the MPs were asked whether they submitted a parliamentary request
in order to examine a state measure in the last four years. If so, they had to specify in
which policy field they proposed the parliamentary request. In total, 717 MPs (49% of the
sample) submitted a parliamentary request in order to demand an evaluation. Although
this percentage is relatively high, one has to consider that MPs can submit parliamentary
requests by other members or with a whole committee. Moreover, not all parliamentary
requests are successfully submitted to the government, since they do not find a majority
in the parliament.
According to Figure 4.3, the distribution of evaluation demand differs highly across the
policy fields. The MPs have most often submitted parliamentary requests in the policy
fields of infrastructure, education, and public finances. In contrast, the fewest parlia-
mentary requests were submitted in the policy fields of justice/migration, security/foreign
affairs, and energy. In doing so, MPs have different preferences in the selection of the
policy field. While MPs from right parties indicated to demand more evaluations in the
policy field of justice/migration and economy, MPs from left parties proposed more re-
quests in the policy field of welfare. Compared to the findings of previous studies on
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In the last four years, in which policy fields did you propose a parliamentary request in
order to examine a state measure with regard to implementation and impact?
evaluation activity across policy fields, MPs tend to demand more evaluations in the field
of infrastructure and public finances. In contrast, less evaluations are requested in the
area of economy.
In order to investigate the variation of evaluations across policy fields, four different
models are tested (Table 4.1). Model 1 tests the explanatory strength of the policy fields’
attribute delegation. The model illustrates that the extent of delegation of a policy field
has a significant influence on the probability to demand an evaluation in a policy field.
In addition, the level of salience and the budget of a policy field also influence the parlia-
mentary demand for an evaluation. The same is true or several variables on the individual
level. In doing so, they indicate that MPs demand evaluations in order to fulfill their
oversight function. Members of oversight committees and opposition parties have a signif-
icantly higher probability to demand evaluations. Moreover, the age, the experience of an
MP as well as the membership in a parliamentary board also increase the likelihood for
a parliamentary request. Regarding the party ideology, pole parties (Social Democrats,
Greens, Swiss People’s Party) also seem to demand more evaluations. In contrast, factors
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Table 4.1: Individual, Policy Field, and Parliament Random Effects Models
Dependent variable: Parliamentary Request








Legitimation × Science 0.941∗∗∗
(0.336)
Salience −0.337∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗ −0.400∗∗∗ −0.405∗∗∗
(0.065) (0.072) (0.087) (0.074)
Budget 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Individual Level
Age 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Men 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.060)
Education 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Center Party −0.155∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗ −0.155∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Opposition 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.012) (0.063) (0.063)
Experience 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Parliament Board 0.156∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.156∗∗ 0.156∗∗
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.073)
Oversight Committee 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055)
Evaluation Attitude 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Parliament Level
Parliament Size −0.002 −0.002 −0.002 −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Evaluation Clause 0.028 0.028 0.027 0.027
(0.108) (0.106) (0.109) (0.108)
Institutional Position 0.247 0.250 0.243 0.248
(0.310) (0.310) (0.311) (0.310)
Intercept −4.734∗∗∗ −4.717∗∗∗ −4.673∗∗∗ −4.653∗∗∗
(0.307) (0.307) (0.311) (0.309)
Residual Variance
Between φ (Parliaments) 0.213 0.213 0.214 0.214
Between φ (Policy Fields) 0.236 0.233 0.238 0.231
Observations 14,040 14,040 14,040 14,040
Log Likelihood -4,839.194 -4,838.170 -4,839.889 -4,837.481
Wald χ2 291.25∗∗∗ 293.10∗∗∗ 289.41∗∗∗ 294.56∗∗∗
Note: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01; Regression coefficients shown with robust standard biases in
parentheses. N=1404 MPs, 10 Policy Fields, 27 Parliaments.
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on the parliament level do not seem to influence the likelihood of demanding an evaluation.
Model 2 includes the interaction term between delegation and science. The model shows
that the effect is not only more significant, but also has a higher influence on the probability
to demand an evaluation. The more evaluations are delegated in a policy field and the
closer the policy field is to science, the more likely a member of parliament will demand
an evaluation. Model 3 includes the variable legitimation. In contrast to delegation, the
need to legitimate public activities only has a weakly significant influence to submit a
parliamentary request in a policy field. However, if we build the interaction term with
science, the effect gets substantially stronger and also becomes highly significant (Model
4).
The results suggest that accountability seems to influence the extent of parliamentary
oversight in the policy fields. First, the policy fields’ attributes delegation and legitima-
tion influence the MP’s likelihood to demand an evaluation in a policy field. Based on the
analysis, we can argue that cooperative governance may increase the need for accountabil-
ity, since the parliamentary oversight is more difficult to fulfill (delegation) respectively
more strongly needed (legitimation). Second, the analysis also provides evidence that the
closeness to science plays an important role as an interacting variable. The closer a policy
field is to science, the more likely a MP will demand an evaluation. This finding is con-
sistent with the literature on the use of knowledge in the policy process, which proclaims
that the attributes of the administrative structure of a policy sector influences knowledge
shifts (Radaelli, 1995; Daviter, 2015). Even though MPs have incentives to demand an
evaluation by the need for accountability in a policy field, they might more likely submit
a parliamentary request if they have the impression that there are enough specialists that
can provide evaluations.11
These findings are important for understanding parliamentary oversight across policy
fields. The study shows that not only institutional settings influence the level of account-
11However, it is also argued in literature that science may potentially raise more conflicts of interest
and thus lead to more parliamentary oversight, respectively to a higher evaluation demand (Brown, 2009).
Though, the attributes science and conflictivity do not correlate with each other (see Table 4.4).
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Note: Predicted probabilities to demand an evaluation with a parliamentary request, as a function of
the interaction between delegation and science as well as legitimation and science for MPs of governmental
parties (full-line) and oppositional parties (dashed-line). The values are calculated for MPs with the
following attributes: men, membership in an oversight committee and in the parliament board. All other
individual and parliamentary variables are at the median.
ability, but also the nature of a policy field. Although individual attributes influence the
MP’s probability to demand evaluations, the effect for the policy fields’ attributes is still
higher. Figure 4.4 illustrates that the effect for legitimation and delegation is stronger
than for being a member in an oppositional party. While a MP’s likelihood to demand an
evaluation increased by 5.1% in the interaction between delegation and science, the proba-
bility to demand an evaluation in a policy field with a high need for legitimation increases
to more than 26.5%. In contrast, the effects for parliament experience, partisanship, or
member of an oversight committee are all smaller, even though significant.
However, the study has three limitations. First, most of the relevant data has been
gathered through a parliamentary survey. Although this approach provides a compre-
hensive overview of the parliamentary demand for evaluations, survey data always entails
methodical problems that question the analytical power of the sample (Bundi et al., 2016).
In doing so, problems of self-selection and misreporting are likely to appear, even if the
measurement errors should be distributed equally across the policy fields. Second a gener-
alization of policy fields’ attributes is challenging. It is unclear whether the policy fields’
attributes are constant over the cantonal and the federal level, since there are no studies
investigating this problem. Last and most important, the concepts delegation and legiti-
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mation might correlate with each other, which the empirical measurement indeed suggests.
For instance, public services might especially be delegated in those policy fields in which
the need for legitimation is particularly high, since the agencies want to implement the
policies with the most important stakeholders in policy networks. Moreover, policy fields
that are particularly close to science might receive more parliamentary oversight, as they
are the ones most likely to be delegated to non-state actors and have a higher need for
legitimation.
4.7 Implications for Other Countries and Oversight Institutions
Although the political system certainly has some particularities, the Swiss case is by far not
disentailed from other countries. The use of parliamentary requests as an oversight tool can
also be observed in other countries, as discussed in section 4.3. Moreover, several studies
recently showed that evaluations are also frequently demanded by other parliaments (Speer
et al., 2015; Zwaan et al., 2016). However, this does not mean that the findings of the
analysis can simply be generalized, but that the dynamics detected in Switzerland should
not be understated as the product of a specific context.
First of all, all parliaments have incentives for parliamentary oversight in temporary
democracies. Previous studies have shown that the MPs want to control the executive due
to the chain of delegation. This is not only true for parliamentary democracies (Saalfeld,
2000; Strøm et al., 2006), but also for countries with presidential systems (Kiewiet and
McCubbins, 1991). Furthermore, several studies show that MPs attempt to oversee the
executive regardless of their oversight institutions (Yamamoto, 2007; Winzen, 2012). How-
ever, although parliamentary requests and questions might be widely used as an oversight
tool in other countries, their use might still differ according to the context of countries
Rozenberg et al. (2011).
Countries differ not only in how the have institutionalized their parliaments, but also
in how they implement their policies. On the one hand, parliaments might have other
instruments for parliamentary oversight. In contrast to Switzerland, those institutions for
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parliamentary oversight could either focus on other oversight mechanisms or have bet-
ter resources for monitoring and reporting. On the other hand, the way of how policies
are implemented might vary significantly across countries. As a consequence, policy net-
works might be more strongly developed in some countries than in others. However, these
different settings do not change the mechanism of how attributes of policy fields shape
parliamentary oversight. Even if MPs use other instruments (committees, hearings etc.)
in order to control the government, they will still rather focus on those policy fields, which
have a higher need for accountability. Several studies suggest that MPs focus on spe-
cific policy fields for accountability reasons. While Winzen (2013) shows how European
integration has an influence on national oversight institutions, since governmental parlia-
mentary groups want to enhance policy participation, Den Boer et al. (2008) demonstrate
that security policies are less investigated by the European Parliament, as the field raises
fewer legitimacy concerns.
Hence, the findings of this article can be applicable to other countries with other
oversight mechanisms. More particularly, there are three different implications for other
countries. First, parliaments can have weak oversight institutions, but their members
might still find a way to fulfill their oversight function. The Swiss case illustrates how
MPs use parliamentary requests in order to oversee the agencies. Second, policy fields
differ in their attributes as they do not only have to deal with different policies, but
they also implement them in varied ways. While some fields delegate more policies to
private organizations, other policy fields lack in political legitimation. This does not mean
that these attributes converge across countries. Other countries - depending on their
institutional and traditional settings - might have another distribution of those attributes
across the policy fields. Third, those attributes have a significant influence on the need
of accountability. Hence, in many countries MPs will have a distinct perception of what
policy areas should be overseen more intensively than others. The findings presented in
this article suggest that the effects of policy fields’ attributes on parliamentary oversight
are diverse, but clearly observable.
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4.8 Conclusion
The article offers empirical evidence that parliaments execute their oversight task variably
across policy fields. In doing so, the analysis shows that MPs interpret their oversight
role differently, since they demand evaluations more frequently in some policy fields than
in others. In those policy fields where more public activities are delegated to private
organizations, MPs are more likely to demand an evaluation. The same is true if the need
for legitimation is particularly high in a policy field. Both effects increase with the policy
field’s closeness to science.
The findings contribute to the literature on accountability, parliamentary oversight, as
well as comparative public policy. First, the analysis highlights the importance of distin-
guishing between different levels of accountability across policy fields. It is evident that
we should study the nature of policy fields and how their attributes affect accountability.
Second, the findings highlight the importance of studying parliamentary oversight across
policy fields, since policy fields vary in their level of accountability. Using the example of
policy evaluation, the study provides an example that parliaments execute their oversight
function unequally across policy fields. Last and most important, the article has important
implications for comparative public policy literature. In the 1970s, Lowi (1972) already
argued that policies determine politics. He argues that not the actual outcomes, but the
expectations on what the outcomes can be, influence the decision-making process. In con-
trast to Lowi, this study shows that policy can also influence the political actors, since
they execute oversight differently. Hence, the article contributes to public policy litera-
ture by using a comparative approach to understand differences of policy fields. Although
in-depth studies on the specific policy sectors are important, a systematic comparison
between the policy fields must be made in order to advance public policy research.
These findings therefore point to the potential of policy fields’ attributes for public
policy research. Although the importance of policy fields are not new in public policy
research (Baumgartner and Jones, 2010), many scholars have so far neglected the influ-
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ence of policy fields’ attributes on politics and have only given attention to institutional
differences of policy areas. Although the Swiss case has some peculiarities, the study has
important implications for other parliaments, since parliamentary oversight can be char-
acterized by various institutions. Depending on the perceived need of accountability, these
focus on different policy fields. Further research yet needs to explore how policy fields’
attributes develop and how they shape politics. I believe this study provides a helpful
starting point for such research.
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Appendix
Table 4.2: Definition of Policy Fields
Policy Fields Specification
State
People, Political Institutions, Cantons, Municipalities,
Church
Education School System, Sciences, Research, Culture
Security/Foreign Affairs Military, Civil Defense, Police, International Relations
Public Finances Taxes, Subsidies, Cuts
Energy
Electricity, Water Power, Nuclear Energy,
Renewable Energy
Infrastructure
Building, Housing, Environment, Telecommunication
Private and Public Transport, Spacial Planning
Health
Healthcare Provision, Food, Veterinary,
Health Promotion and Prevention
Welfare Familiy, Social Insurance, Social Assistance
Economy
Labor, Services, Industry, Trade, Craft, Agriculture,
Forestry
Justice/Migration
Civil and Criminal Law, Immigration, Asylum,
Integration, Naturalization
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Table 4.3: Definition of Policy Fields’ Attributes
Attribute Definition
Delegation Delegation is an act where an administration unit that is responsible for
a public service delegates the execution of the public service to a private
organization.
Legitimacy Legitimation is the moral conviction that an administration unit
produces public activities, which are valid and eligible to solve a social
problem.
Conflictivity The level of conflict reflects the degree of incompatibility of basic beliefs
of competing coalitions over policy goals in a policy field.
Science Closeness to science describes in what extent scientific research deals
with issues of a policy field.
Salience Salience of a policy field is the quantity of attention, which policy issues
of a policy field get from external actors and how these actors value
the need for action that has to be taken in a policy field.
Table 4.4: Covariance Matrix of Policy Fields’ Attributes
Variable Delegation Legitimation Salience Conflictivity Science
Delegation 1.000
Legitimation 0.769 1.000
Salience 0.270 0.551 1.000
Conflictivity 0.209 0.565 0.950 1.000
Science 0.830 0.636 0.210 0.169 1.000
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Table 4.5: Operationalization of the Variables





In the last four years, in which policy fields did you
propose a parliamentary request in order to examine
a state measure with regard to implementation and






On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
extent of delegated public services in the following
policy fields during the last four years?





On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position
the need to legitimate public activities in the following
policy fields during the last four years?





On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
salience of the following policy fields during the last
four years? Continuous scale, standardized:




On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
level of conflict in the following policy fields during
the last four years? Continuous scale, standardized:




On a scale from 1 to 10, where do you position the
closeness to science of the following policy fields
during the last four years? Continuous scale,
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Sex Dummy: 0 for male, 1 for female Parliament
Survey
Education
What is your highest degree of education?
Continuous scale:




Party membership in a center party (FDP.
The Liberals, Christian Democratic People’s Party,
Green Liberal Party, Conservative Democratic Party,
Christian Social Party, Evangelical People’s Party




Party membership in an oppositional party






How many years of experience do you have in a
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Membership in an oversight committee





Index of three dimensions:
- During the last four years, how many times did
you read an evaluation summary?
- Evaluations are a useful instrument for me as a
member of parliament.
- Whenever possible, my political decisions
are supported by evaluation or other studies.
Categorial scale: 1 (never/strongly disagree) -














General evaluation clause in the cantonal/federal
constitution
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